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MICRO IMPACTS OF MACROECONOMIC
ADJUSTMENT POLICIES (MIMAP): PHASE II
Integrative Report"
Mario B. Lamberte, Gilberto M. Llanto
and Aniceto C Orbeta, Jr.'"
I. INTRODUCTION
Structural adjustment policies are economy-wide policies designed to induce efficiency
and growth in the economy. In contrast, stabiliT_fiOllmeasuresare those macropolicies which
are intended to correct fundamentalimbalancesin the economy, moreparticularlythe fiscal.and
the balance of payments accounts. Structuraladjustment policies like trade liberalizationand
market-orientedexchange ratepolicy will make for a more efficient and competitive economy
while the take-off to the growth path is premised on the successful restoration of internaland
externalbalance. Failing to do so will only lead the economy to more stagnationand retarded
growth.
However, this does not meanthat adjustmentpolicies yield unqualifiedbenefits. While
internal and externalbalance may be restored through a package of adjustm_t policigs, they
may have differentialimpacts on householdsand firms. At the micro level, there may even be
organizedresistance against these policies becauseof the belief that livelihoods and survival are
at stake as may be seen in the vehement opposition launched by urban workers and other
organizedgroups to devaluation and fiscal restraint.
It is recognized tlmtpolicy makers may introducemapproprtatepackageof adjustment
policies which more discerningpartiesresist. But it may also happenthateven with _ppropriate
policies resistance will arise. The first case implies the need to completely do away with the
•harmful package; in the latter, designand recognitionof_djustment costs will be needed to push
for acceptance of policies that would propel the economy unto the path of efficiency_and
*This study was rome possible through the financial assistance of the International Development Research
Centre 0DRC). Special thanks go to Dr. Randy Spence and Mr. Jingjal Hanehanlash for encouraging the conduct of
this study.
"*Vice President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS); Executive Director, Agricultural Credit
Policy Council (ACPC); and Deputy Director, ACPC.
sustainable growth. It may be that acceptance and promotion of such policies are hindered by
the painful adjustments that hitherto protected sectors and the vulnerable will face.
The project, Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic Adjustment Policies (MIMAP), grew out
of the concern that policy measures implemented to correct serious economic imbalances and
induce the economy to efficiency and sustainable growth may have unanticipated and differential
welfare impact at the household and firm level. To the extent that they have negative welfare
effects on the most vulnerable groups of the society who may find great difficulty in coping with
the new environment, then, policymakers must anticipate the nature and magnitude of said
effects so that corrective measures may be appropriately designed.
The paper prepared by Lamberte, Lianto, Lapar and Orbeta (1991) provides a general
framework for analyzing the micro impacts of macroeconomic adjustment policies (Figure I).
In particular, macroe_nomic adjustment policies impact on households and firms through three
possible transmission channels namely factor markets, product markets and government
expenditures, given the country's institutional structure.
During the workshop held in February 1991 in which the said framework paper was
presented, the participants representing various sectors arrived at the conclusion that their
knowledge of how a particular policy works its way through the various transmission channels
and eventually impact on the households and firms is seriously inadequate. This knowledge is
extremely important to provide policymakers with a concrete policy handle. It was then
suggested that the next phase of the MIMAP project should focus on a few issues or sectors to
make the analysis of the effects of specific policies on the welfare of vulnerable groups tractable.
Aside from the effects of macro adjustment policies, effects of sectoral adjustment policies may
be included in the analysis. The main objective of the research at this stage is to develop
specific testable hypotheses on how adjustment policies affect the welfare of households,
especially the vulnerable groups. The research at this stage must rely on available theoretical
and empirical literature. This exercise is necessary to provide more focus to future research on
the micro impacts of macroeconomic adjustment policies, which admittedly is a relatively new
research area.
The MIMAP research project requires quantification of the welfare effects of adjustment
policies at the household level, thus, it was felt necessary to id_intify a few welfare and
intervening indicators that are highly sensitive to adjustment policies and can be regularly
monitored. This is to be accompanied by an analysis of the quantity and quality of social
services received by households in recent years, the factors determining them and how these will
be affected by ¢_nt and future adjustment policies.
Since the main concern of the MIMAP is to see how vulnerable groups are affected by
adjustment policies, it was thought necessary to identify these groups to facilitate the selection
of sectors or areas to be included in the research. There was a consensus among participants
that the vulnerable groups are those that are heavily dependent on agriculture and natural
resources for their livelihood and those that belong to the industrial informal sector. It was also
recognized that adjustment policies may have gender-specific effects that ultimately impact on
Figure 1
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the vulnerablegroups. Thus, a more detailed analysisof these areas are included in the second
phase of the MLMAPproject.
Therewere other issues raised by the frameworkpaperand suggested by the participants
for closer examination. But the one given toppriorityis the regulatoryframework,whichis the
embodiment of or a translationof policies into operational terms. Essentially, it defines the
limits within which various markets can operate and, in effect, modifies the manner by which
policies impact on the households.
Seven principal investigatorswere invited by the MIMAP ProjectManagement Office to
undertake studies on the following areas: macroeconomic analysis, agriculture sector, natural
resources andenvironmentsector, industrial informal sector, social services sector, government
regulations and monitoring. The specific objectives of these studies are presented in Annex A.
Each investigatorworked with a networkcomposed of individuals who are knowledgeable with
the issues related to the respective topics.
This paper reports and integrates the majorfindings of these studies. It also draws on
information or results of related studies to complementthe findings of the seven studies.
The next section discusses the evolution and scale of recent macroeconomicimbalances
and the adjustment measures adopted by policymakers. Section III provides a general
perspective of the transmissionmechanisms. Section IV discusses the transmissionmechanisms
in each selected areas and the majorresearch issues/hypotheses that emerged from the
discussions. The last section presents a system of monitoring the micro impacts of
macroeconomicadjustmentpolicies.
II. RECENT MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND ADJUSTMENT MEASURES
This section sets the tone for analyzing the micro impact of macroeconomic adjustment
policies by discussing the scale and evolution of macroeconomic imbalancesand by identifying
certain options that might allow the country to deal with these imbalances. This sets out the
constraintswithin which policy choices in specific sectors have to be made.
Since the Second World War, the Philippines already encountered seven balance of
payments crises. For purposes of this paper, the period of analysis covers only the years 1986-
1992, the administration of President Aquino, because first of all, many wide-ranging
adjustment measures were introduced during this period and secondly, most of the effects of
these measures will be felt in the next few years.
The Philippines suffered the worst balance of payments crisis in 1983:1985, when GNP
growth rate averaged -4.8 percent. Upon assumption to power in 1986, the Aquino
administration put together an economic program designed to achieve economic recovery in the
short-term and sustainable growth in the medium-term. The real GNP growth rate target was
set at 6.8 percent on the average for the period 1987-1992.
The Aquino administration undertook major reforms to deal with certain structural
weaknesses of some areas of the economy (Figure 2). These reforms were supposed to attain
specific objectives, such as financially stable government, more private sector investments, more
competitive and export-oriented industries, more effective financial intermediation, adequate
public infrastructure, democratized agricultural activities and well-managed environment, all of
which are necessary to bring the economy into the path of economic recovery and sustainable
growth. Most of the reforms were supported by financial assistance from multi-lateral agencies,
such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and development agencies of developed
countries, such as the USAID and OECF, to reduce any short-run negative impact they might
create in the process of implementation.
The economy showed strong recovery during the first three years of the Aquino
administration, with real GNP growth rate averaging 5.5 percent (Figure 3). Unfortunately, the
growth momentum was not sustained. Real GNP growth rate started to decline in 1989 and
became negative in 1991. The first quarter growth rate for 1992 was only very modest at 2.4
percent.
External and internal factors accounted for the unsustained growth of the economy.
Growth of developed countries slowed down and adversely affected demand for Philippine
exports. This occurred at the same time when prices of imported commodities, particularly oil,
increased in 1990, while prices of Philippine exports declined. The Gulf crisis significantly
raised the oil import bill of the Philippines and also adversely affected the tourism industry.
Conspiring with the unfavorable external environment were the series of natural calamities that
occurred within a span of three years, inflicting severe damage to the productive capacity of the
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7economy and several_coup attempts launched
by disgruntled military officers that shook the
confidence of local and foreign investors in _'_3
the economy. Perhaps, more important
among the internal factors that contributed to _'*"
the slowing down of economic grovth was ' GNPRealGrowlhRatess
the delay in the implementation Of much r --o_,
needed policy reforms in key sectors of the 0
economy to correct structural weaknesses. 6
For instance, the restructuring of the tariff ,
system was implemented only in 1991 and its
full effects can only be felt in mid-1990s 2
because the tariff reduction is being phased 10
over a five-yeal" period. The liberalization of .1
foreign investment started only in 1991 and it .2
would take some time for foreign investors to lm ,_ li ,m _"* '_ v.,
take advantage of this new foreign investment
environment. Some aspects of the tax
reforms were approved by Congress only
lately. The liberalization of bank entry and
branching and of the foreign exchange market
was undertaken only in the 1990s. The same
is true of transport liberalization. Inappropriate exchange rate policy was also a big contributory
factor. Specifically, the exchange rate policy pursued by the Monetary Authorities failed to
maintain a realistic and competitive exchange rate, thereby undermining the competitiveness of
Philippine exports.
Signs of external imbalance actually started to appear as early as 1986. Since that year
the balance of payments worsened and became negative in 1990 (Table 1). This was due to the
deteriorating current account position, which declined from US$996 million in 1986 to -US$2.7
billion in 1990. This, in turn, was caused by the deficit in the merchandise trade, which
consistently widened during the period 1986-1990 from -US$202 to -US$4 billion. It means that
export growth substantially lagged behind import growth. As a percent of (3NP, the current
account deficits surged to 6.1 percent in 1990 from a surplus of 3.4 percent of in 1986. The
gross international reserves reached an uncomfortable level of US$2 billion as of end-1990, well
below the target level of US$3 billion.
The Aquino administration started out with a very high budget deficit (as a percent of
GNP) as a re._ult of the carryover of the effects of the election spending, the assumption by the
National Government of non-pertbrming assets of government financial institutions, which was
one of the reforms undertaken to rehabilitate ailing government financial institutions, and the
expansionary fiscal programs adopted by the government to revivethe economy. The
government was relatively successful in reducing the deficits by introducing certain measures,
such as those that resulted in an increase in total revenue effort (Table 2). However, current
8II IIII II I III II I
Table 1
BALANCEOF PAYMENTSACCOUNT%1
1986-1991
(In Million US Dollars)
ITEM 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
.............................................................................................
I. CURRENTRANSACTIONS
Merchandise Trade -202 -1017 -1085 -2598 -4020 -3212
Exports 4842 5720 7074 7821 8186 8839
Imports 5044 6737 8159 10419 12206 12051
Non-Merchandise Trade 757 0 -80 312 611 1351
InfLow 3791 3454 3592 4586 4842 5624
outflow 3034 3454 3672 4274 4231 4273
Transfers 441 573 775 830 714 827
Inf [ow 445 575 778 832 717 828
Outf tow 4 2 3 2 3 1
CURRENTACCOUNT,TOTAL 996 -444 -390 -1456 -2695 -1034
of GNP 3.4 -1.4 -1 -3.5 -6.1 " -2.3
l I. NON-MONETARYCAPITAL
Long-Term Loans 815 159 -519 381 406 922
Inflow 2545 2598 2412 2797 4321 3613
Outflow 1730 2439 2931 2416 3915 2691
Foreign Investments 140 326 986 843 480 654
inflow 186 439 1077 961 706 798
Outflow 46 113 91 118 226 144
Short-Term Capi tat -814 80 -303 -89 19 369
Errors and Omissions -102 -144 479 383 587 -150
NON-MONETARYCAPITAL, TOTAL 39 421 643 1518 1692 1795
Monetization of Gold 279 365 314 288 218 245
Allocation of SDR 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revaluation Adjustments -72 -78 83 101 800 399
I I I. UNREMITTABLEARREARS/ADJUSTMENTS 0 0 0 0 O 0
IV. OVERALLSURPLUS/DEFICIT(-) 1242 264 650 451 -185 1405
.................................................................... _--_ .....................
\1 After rescheduting and new money
Source: central Bank of the Philippines
I I I II II I II I I IIIII
expenditures continued to grow as a result of rising interest payments on liabilities of the
government corporations and financial institutions assumed by the National Government. In
1990, the fiscal deficit suddenly ballooned due to an unanticipated rise in interest payments that
were brought about by a combination of high interest rates and greater volume of Treasury bills
being sold, the increase in outlays for personal services as the number of employees increas'exl
and government salaries increased with the implementation of the Salary Standardization Law,
gadvances related to the debt reduction program and subsidies to the Oil Price Stabilization
(OPSF).
The extent of the contribution of interest bill to the fiscal deficit may be appreciated more
looking at Table 3. If interest payments were netted out, the primary fiscal balance shows
generally increasing surplus.
U I , I I L II
Tab_ 2
REVENUES, DISBURSEMENTS, and DEFICITS, 19BO-g1
(In BZrK)n Pesos)
........................................ _ ..........................................................
YEAR REVENUE AS % OF GNP DISBURSEMENTS AS % OF GNP DEFICIT AS % OF GNP
1980 34.7 13.13 38.1 14,41 3.4 1.28
1981 35.9 11.82 48.1 15.84 12.2 4.02
1982 38.2 11.39 52.6 15.68 14.4 4.29
1983 45.6 12.04 53.0 13.99 7.4 1.95
1984 56.8 10.77 66.9 12.69 10.1 1.92
1985 69.0 11.54 60.1 13.40 11.1 1.86
1986 7_,2. 12.88 110.5 17.98 31.3 5_09
1987 1b3.2; 14.67 119.9 17.05 16.7 2.37
1988 112.9 13.72 136.1 16.54 23.2 2.82
1989 152.4 15.64 172.0 17.88 19.6 2.04
1990 180.9 15.97 218.9 19.33 37.2 3.29
1991 219.9 17.30 246.3 19.38 26.4 2.09
SOURCES: Department of Budget and Management
Bureau of the Treasury
Table 3
BUDGET DEFICIT AND INTEREST PAYMENTS
(In Billion Pesos)
INTEREST PAYMENTS
TRADITIONAL REGULAR ASSUMED TOTAL PRIMARY _ OF GNP"
BUDGETDEFICIT LIABILITIES BUDG.SURPLUS
..........................................................................................
1985 (11,1) 14.6 0 14.6 3.5 0.6
1986 (31,3) 20.9 .7 21.6 (9.7) (1.6)
1987 (16,7) 24.7 12.2 36.9 20.2 2.9
1988 (23,2) 32.7 13.2 45.9 22.7 2.8
1989 (19,6) 41.4 13.3 54.7 35.1 3,7
1990 (37.2) 57.1 14.0 71.1 33.9 3.2
1991 (26,6) 69.8 13.6 83.4 56.8 4.5
SOURCES: Department of Budget and, Management
Nationat Economic and Devetopment Authority
Bureau of the Treasury
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The consolidated public budget deficit (CPSD), which sums up the deficits of all the
organizations within the public sector,tens a grimmer picture. After it tapered off in 1987 to
2.2 percent of GNP from a high of 4.8 percent in 1986, it began to rise in the subsequent years
and posted at 5.4 percent in 1990 (Table 4). Aside from the deficit of the National Government
which almost doubled in 1990, the huge deficits of the Central Bank, government corporations
and the OPSF accounted for the big jump in the CPSD.
Part of the CPSD had been financed by money creation. As maybe gleaned from Table
5, the growth of base money accelerated during the period 1986-1989. Although the growth rate
declined in 1990, it is still high compared to historical levels, except 1989. The accelerating
growth in the money supply, combined with cost-push factors such as severe weather
disturbances and natural calamities and the third oil shock, exerted pressure on domestic prices.
As may be seen from Figure 4, inflation rate accelerated from 0.8 percent in 1986 to 17.7
percent in 1991.
The macro imbalances above clearly
called for drastic corrective measures, which
the government promptly did. It first Figure4
discontinued the IMF-supported EFF program
be,cause the targets were already unattainable, ,,_ a,_
= INFLATIONRATE(%)
and negotiated for a new economic o
stabilization program that was approved and 8
began in early 1991. The program includes e
the following measures: selective cut on ,
expenditures; elimination of subsidies to the 2
OPSF; increasing user charges of government *
corporations to improve their revenue s
position; increasing revenues through e
improved tax collection and new taxes; and ' _
allowing base money and broad money to _ jz-0 • • ',
grow by about 12 percent per annum. The ,_ ,_ _m lm 1M 1_1v.,
refusal by Congress to pass new tax measures
prompted the government to temporarily
impose a 9 percent import levy.
So far, the stabilization program --
seems to have worked. The current account deficit dropped significantly from 6.1 percent of
GNP in 1990 to 2.3 percent of GNP in 1991. Gross international reserves shot up to US$4.5
billion at end-1991 (equivalent to about 3.2 months of imports) from US$2 billion a year ago.
The fiscal deficit was redt_ced to 2.1 percent of GNP in 1991 from 3.5 percent in 1990.
Likewise, the CPSD dropped to 2.8 percent of GNP from 5 percent in the same period. The
decline in the oil prices and appreciation of the peso acted favorably on the CPSD. The drop
11
in the 91-dayTreasury bill rate from art average of 23.4 percent in 1990 to an average of 21.1
percent in 1991 also eased up the interest bill of the government. The annualized monthly
II I IlL in
Teble 4
CONSOUDATED PUBUC SECTOR DB:ICIT, 1985-92
(In NEon Pemes)
1985 1986 1987 1968 1989 1990 1991 1992
Estimate Forecast
National Government 11.1 31.3 16.7 23.2 19.6 37.2 26.6 3.6
Major Corporations 8.1 6.8 3.2 -2 4.4 19.1 15.4 13,7
LGUsand Social "Security Inst. -0.9 -5.9 -5.3 -5.4 -4.2 -11.6 -8,9 -11.5
Gov't Financial Institutions 18,5 12 -1.3 -1.8 -3.3 -3.1 -2 -3.2
central Bank 15,5 18.2 10.9 16.9 20.8 21.9 21.5 36.1
OiL Price StabiLization Fund 0 0 0 0 7,1 7.4 -11.5 2.5
Intersectorat Transfers -16.1 -32.7 -8.7 -1.1 -5.3 -13.1 -9.6 -4.2
Total PubLic _Sector Deficit 36.2 29.7 15.5 29.8 39.1 57.8 31.5 37.0
As a percent of GNP 6.1 4,8 2.2 3.6 4.1 5.4 2.5 2.6
......................................... _._.._ ..................... . ......................................
Source: Department of Budget and Nanagemont
TaMe5
MONETARY INDICATORS
(In Bim Pesos)
1986 1987 i988 1989 1990 1991
1. Base Money /1 56.0 61.3 71.8 97.4 123.0 141.0
Change 9.5 17.1 35.7 26.3 14,6
2. Reserve Noney 50.0 56.9 67.3 92.9 108.7 129.4
3. Domestic Liquidity 141.1 159.2 198.5 253.9 300.5 34_'.1
X Change(end period) 6.2 12.8 24.6 27.9 18.4 15.1
Honey suppLy 42.6 52.1 59.7 78.5 89.0 101.4
Quasi-Noney 93.6 103.5 136,3 172.6 208.3 242.7
Deposit Substitutes 4.9 3.6 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.0
/1 Data reflects expanded coverage of deposit moneybanks and other changes
in the classification of ex;counts
Soupee: Central Bank of the PhiLippines
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inflation rates in the last months of 1991 and the first half of 1992 decelerated to less than 10
percent.
While the success of th_erecent stabilization program is welcome, still it inflicted high
social costs. Moreover, it presents some uncertainties in the future. First, the correctionof the
current account balance was accomplished largely by dampening imports, instead of increasing
exports, through a combination of tight monetary and fiscal policy that led to a recession. Since
the program left the structure of trade unchanged, there is a big possibility that as growth
resumes, import growth will far exceed export growth, and in a few years, another external
imbalance is going to occur as happened in the past crises. Second, the fiscal deficit was put
under control partly through steep cuts in capital outlays and partly through the temporary
imposition of the 9 percent import levy. Given the poor state of infrastructure in the country,
these cuts will have severe implications on the expected economic recovery. The recent
elimination of the import levy presents another problem especially since Congress is not
sympathetic to any new tax measures proposed by the executive branch. And third, the sharp
decline in the demand for imports coupled with substantial foreign remittance and portfolio
investment inflows caused substantial appreciation of the peso, thereby worsening incentives for
exporters.
It seems that the new Administration is going to hang on to the same stabilization
approach, i.e., tight monetary and fiscal'policy, to avoid the "boom and bust" scenario. It
means that a slower growth is to be expected in the next few years. The social costs of this
approach will definitely be far greater than the previous occasions. It is well known that slow
growth of the economy exacts a heavy toll on those occupying the lowest rung in the society.
Between 1985 and 1988, when the economy achieved relatively impressive growth rates, poverty
incidence only marginally decreased from 58.9 percent to 55.2 percent. In terms of actual
levels, however, the number of families failing below the poverty line increased from 5.8 million
in 1985 to 5.817 million families. This has certainly increased further between 1988 and 1991
considering the slowdown in the economy during this period. It only means that the poverty
alleviation objective will never be achieved with a low growth rate.
The issue is whether there are other options that would put the economy into the high
growth path without falling into the "boom and bust" scenario and extracts lesser adjustment
costs during the adjustment process. Medalla (1992) and Intal (1992) have pointed out the social
costs of stabilization could have been lower had the policymakers given exchange rate policy a
greater role and reduce their reliance on fiscal and monetary tools. In fact, the exchange rate
pursued by the government during the period 1986-1991 had weakened the peso's
competitiveness vis-a-vis other ASEAN countries (Table 6). 1 There are several reasons why
policymakers are averse to a major depreciation of the peso. One is that it would add to the
losses of the Central Bank whose foreign liabilities greatly exceed foreign assets. It would also
lMedalla (1992) pointed out that Thailand's high growth of imports did not need a large depreciation of the Baht
because it has been able to attract foreign investments in export-oriented firms,
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add more burden to the fiscal sector since a greater proportion of external debts axe public.
Another reason is that it would create more pressure to adjustthe legislated minimumwages,
which wouldjust wipe out the gains from large depreciation.
Since mid-1991, the Central Bank started to deregulate the foreign exchange market.
Among the important measures adopted were the lifting of restrictions on the repatriationof
foreigninvestmentflows; allowing exporters to take outforeign currency loans from the Foreign
Currency Deposit Units (FCDUs); and allowing exporters to keep and use freely 40 percentof
their export proceeds. The expectation was that it would lead to a depreciation of the peso
without the CentralBankhavingto intervene actively. However, the opposite has occurred, i.e.,
the peso has appreciated, with the appreciationaccelerating towards the second half of 1991.
The foreign exchange deregulati0n has contributed to this condition by easing the way for
portfolio inflows and by inducing additional
inflows in the form of a massive increase in
overseas workers' remittances. " '" '
Table 6
Theresponseof the,CentralBankwas RELATIVEPRICECOMPETITIVENESSINDICES_1
to try to prevent the appreciationof the peso (December1980ffi 10011
by buying foreign exchange from the bourse. _.........
However, to meet the monetary ceilings MaLaysia Thailand Indonesia
under the current LMFstabilization program, .................................................
the Central Bank had to sterilize its purchases ls_, 86.32 96.15 111.921987 87.11 96.56 161.79
by issuing its own liabilities. This has the 1sin 93.73 96.82 166.98
effect of increasing money market rates, 1989 99.06 99.90 168.651990 98.00 95.15 162.81
which all the more makesholding domestic 1sin 100.1a 93.71 165.99
financial assets very attractive. Medalla .................................................
(1992) calculated the sum of the rates of \1 Ratio of PhiLippinepeso's REERIto thoseof
selected ASEANcurrencies. Over/Under 100
interest and the peso appreciation which indicates that the PhiLippines is Less/more
represents the rate of return to an investor competitive thantheothercountries.
who converts US dollars into pesos to buy so_c,: CentralBankof the Philippines -
Treasury bills and then reconverts back into I II I
dollars the proceeds from the maturing
Philippine Treasury bills, and found this to be four times higher than the US rates (Table 7).
So long as the CentralBankpursues the same strategy, thatis, purchasingforeign exchange and
sterilizing its purchasesto meet the stabilizationprogram's
ceilings, foreign exchange inflows will coiatinueand will cause moreappreciationof the peso.
This clearly calls for an alternativeapproach to the current macroeconomicproblem. The
stabilization program was designed without having in mind the possibility of massive foreign
exchange inflows occurring duringa recessionary period. The massive inflows suggest that
inflationary expectation has come down, and therefore the demand for real cash balances has
increased. If this is not being accommodated by the Monetary Authorities because of some
ceilings on monetary aggregates, real interest rate will likely increase, thereby discouraging
investments. Thus, the appropriate measure seems to be to accommodate the increase in demand
14
for real cash balances, which means that monetary aggregates should be allowed to grow higher
than what is being prescribed in the current stabilization program. This would allow for higher
growth and therefore the stabilization program will inflict less social cost.
For the gains of the stabilization program to be preserved, other macroeconomic
adjustment measures should be put in place. One area is increased mobilization of domestic
savings. This would involve improvement in tax collection and introducing new tax measures
to deal with the gaps left behind by the 1986 tax reforms. Aside from improving efficiency in
the use of resources, the government needs to increase its revenues to compensate for the sharp
decline in capital outlays in the past year. More private savings could be mobilized by
increasing the competitiveness of the banking system through bank entry and branch banking
policy that is more liberal than the current policy, by eliminating intermediation taxes, and by
developing the capital markets by automating the trading, clearing and settlements systems,
establishing investor information services, by strengthening the supervisory function of the
regulatory body. The tariff
, , reform program is already in
Tab=a7 place. But the possibility of
accelerating it for some key
DOLLAR-YIELD OF 91-DAY T-BILLS items should be seriously
(Quarterly Data) considered, especially since
................................................................ the foreign exchange market isRATEOF INTEREST(91-DAY EXCHANGE
PERIO0 APPRECIATION T-BILL), (A+B) RATE(P/S) now more openthantwoyears
(A) (B) ago.................................................................
1991.1 0.0_ 25.3_ 25.3_ 28.00001991.2 0.2_ 19.5_ 19._ 27.r_SS The discussions above
1991.3 8.8g 19.7_ 28.5g 26.9854 brought out several key points.1991.4 4.1g 21.4_ 25.5_ 26.6183
................................................................. Oneis that whenaneconomy
Source:CentralBankof thePhiLippines i s e x p e r i e n c i n g
macroeconomic imbalances,.
"'" ' " ' '"' stabilization measures are
necessary. It must be well
understood that the adjustment to an equilibrium path inflects some soeial costs. However,
efforts could be exerted to lessen their social costs. This brings us to the next point, that is,
some adjustments must be accommodated in any stabilization program whenever some
unanticipated phenomenon occurs. In the case of the Philippines, it shows in the form of foreign
exchange shocks coinciding with the severe drop in import demand causing some appreciation
of the peso. And third, adjustment measures necessary to address structural weaknesses must
be implemented. Delay in their implementation could undermine the sustainability of the growth
process.
While policymakers, academics and the general public are aware of adjustment costs and
the need to address this issue, little is known about the process of adjustment, the specific costs
borne by different sectors (i.e., non-homogeneous groups), coping mechanisms, survival
strategies - information that can help the government formulate appropriate policy handles and
intervention.
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HI. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS: A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE
An adjustment program designed to restore macro balances and to position the economy
into a sustainable growth path is important. However, the.re may be strong resistance against
its implementation in a developing economy like the Philippines because it can aggravate the
economic circumstances of certain groups in the economy, especially the so-called vulnerable
groups. The way the adjustment program is designed and implemented is critical to a successful
launch of the economy to the growth_path.
Adjustment policies have differential impacts on different groups of households and firms.
When the government decides, for example, to pursue a tight budgetary policy as a component
of the adjustment program the incidence of public expenditures (i.e. of public goods and services
that remain after the budget cuts ) falls disproportionately over different income classes and
types of households and firms. Based on their capacity (I) to cope with the slowdown in
economic activity following the budget cuts and to take advantage of opportunities created by
a new policy regime and (2) their ability to influence the distribution of public goods and
services, households will experience divergent degrees of welfare loss and firms will face
different growth and profit contours.
For these reasons knowledge of the transmission mechanisms of adjustment policies is
important. The Lamberte, Llanto, Lapar and Orbeta framework paper provided a cursory
outline of transmission mechanisms. This section tries to bring out more sharply the issues and
to define in greater detail the intricate links and relationships between adjustment policies and
households/firms and their implications for future empirical investigation.
A. TRANSMISSION CHANNELS AND MECHANISMS
It is important to distinguish between transmission channels and mechanisms. The
channels are the mutes or conduits through which adjustment policies are worked out and
eventually impact on households and firms. The identified channels are (1) the product or goods
market; (2) the factor markets, of which the labor market is a major element because here the
vulnerable groups are participants and (3) government expenditure or the provision of public
goods and services. Households and firms (i.e. economic agents in general) are both consumers
and producers in varying capacities. They participate in the market economy through their
behavior in factor and product markets and in their utilization of public goods ,and services (
from hereon, public goods). But factor and product markets and the distribution of public goods
do not exist in a vacuum. They are strongly ,affected,and determined by the paraneters set by
government polici_ _and the regulatory/institutional enyironmertt,,exte_ factors and initial
endowments.
What is little understood and empirically verified but which is more interesting is how
adjustment policies affect households and firms. An understanding of the transmission
mechanisms is more important because the design and implementation of a successful adjustment
program hinges on it. The id_tification of the right policy handle is only :possible if the
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government were properly informed of the ramifications of specific adjustment policies, or of
a combination of those policies, particularly on the incidence of those policies. It is relatively
easy to identify what ails the economy but the prescription of the appropriate policy measures
to address the malady is not a picnic, to say the least. To a very great extent, the correct
diagnosis of the illness depends on an understanding of the illness and what gives rise to it. But
equally important is to understand the likely impact of corrective or preventive measures, the
routes or channels through which these measures will work and the mechanisms or manner in
which these measures will affect households and firms whose welfare is the ultimate objective
of adjustment measures/policies.
An important assumption in the study of transmission mechanisms is that rational
economic agents participate in the market economy. The agents produce and consume in the
market economy and in so doing, they are affected by policies, rules and regulations and
interventions that are introduced by an important actor in the economy, the government.
However, the MIMAP frameworkpaper distinguished between subsistenceand above-subsistence
households who are affected differently by adjustment policies. The subsistence households
engage in their own production and consumption activities which are largely outside the reach
of the formal market economy, and perhaps, even by direct government intervention. Their
interaction with the formal economy is quite minimal and is confined to activities that pertain
to survival. While they may be the objects of various governmental and private initiatives, there
is a great chance that they are not effectively touched or reached by these attempts.
This strong view has to be qualified. There is a large informal sector in many
developing economies which for practical reasons participate in the formal market economy
albeit in an "invisible" way. Households and even fledgling firms in the informal sector
constitute the so-called "parallel" or "underground" economy many of whose members belong
to the subsistence sector. Thus, to a certain extent, subsistence households,and firms do
participate in the formal market although such participation is somewhat weakened by their
inability to access directly resources and services from formal institutions.
The literature identifies three transmission mechanisms, namely: (1) relative prices; (2)
incomes or purchasing power and (3) access (or lack of it) to resources, like public goods.
The first set of transmission mechanism consists of (a) the relative price of factors and
(b) the relative price of outputs. Economic agents respond to relative prices by changing the
structure of demands for and supplies of inputs and outputs. When adjustment policies tilt
relative output prices in favor of say, of a given good, resources shift towards that sector which
produces the particular good and the sector is benefitted by the adjustment policies. The
reverse happens in the sector that produces the goods which face a weak demand. This sector
loses resources. Households, therefore, who possess skills that have become redundant because
of the shift in demand for other types of skills induced by the increased production in the
favored sector suffer a Welfare loss.
The second transmission mechanism, that is, income or purchasing power, determines
the consumption bundle of households while the budget constraint determines the production
possibilities of firms. Household members who are laid off as a result say, of a reduction in
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expenditures for infrastructure, immediately lose the capacity to demand goods and services and
suffer the consequences of a reduction in well-being. Firms whose inve,qment budgets, for
example, are held back for fear of losing specific markets due to the change in macro policies,
will not realize their profit and output potential and may become stagnant. The loss of ma/kets
for their goods can spell disaster for those firms, the cepital-owners and workers alike.
/
By the same token, an adjustment program with a fight fiscal policy component will likely
reduce the amount of public goods that the government "produces". Households who are
dependent for their well-being on continuous access to decent health, education and nutrition
services, will be immediately affected by the budget cuts. On the other hand, a reduction in
infrastructure outlays will mean a.drop in private sector employment and output with adverse
impacts on households. In beth instances, the lack of access to certain,public goods will affect
adversely the level of welfare (in the case of households) and the output and profit potential (
in the case of firms). In the final analysis, the absence (or presence) of those public goods
.pursuant to specific adjustment policies will define to some degree the overall level of
productivity of the economy which ,determines whether or not the economy can sooner move into
the growth path.
B. MARKETS, ADJUSTMENT POLICIE_ AND TRANSMISSION MF_HANISMS
1. Impacts throu_Factor _Markets
The impact of adjustment on labor,markets is not_known a ufiori but it is de_rmined by
the households' and the firms' propensities to work and,produce, respectively, as well as by
their response to shifts in production incentives and correspondingly in relative wages in the
labor markets. Relative wages determine the decision by households to work and the wiilin"gness
of firms to ,hire labor. Adjustment policies that induce the hiring of more labor will be
beneficial to households whose, only marketable asset is their labor power. The adjustment
policies, must, however, contendwith the structut_ of theiabor marketslwhich will condition the
way labor.will.respo_to the ctmages brought about by _thosepolicies_=- " _.
.. If..labor .surplus..is assumed,_.a demand deflation 4hat is brought about .by adjustment
policies will add to _thepool of the unemployed and underemployed as firms .retrench:workers.
If a neoclas,_ic,at labor market structure is postulated,, the_labor adjusts to what the market
dictates and theoretically, there.will be equilibrium in the_product and .labor.markets. If a
dualistic labor, market is premised, ..then ._themodem sectbmwill,behave differently., from the
traditionalsector whi¢_-if dominated by marginal and.subsistence ,households may care.less for
adjustment poli_'es that only indirectly !impingeon their coflsumptiomand production activities.
However,. ff the mo_'n sector in .,the dualistic ,labor-raa_ket _suffema.decline in_:output_and
employment because. ,of adjustment policies, _the informal_sceto_ might act_as; absorber,,of _the
labor laid offin the modem sector. The unemployed willi_pili over to,the,traditional or,informal
sector depressing,:further,,labor's, mar_ productivity and thus, real wages. The decline in
real wages will negatively affect their demand for wage goods and their productivitydeclines
over time.
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Horton et al. (1991) observed that many adjustment programs focus on changes in the
composition of output. Expenditure-switching policies change relative prices of goods and
induce the production of exportables and importables and a reduction of the production of non-
tradables. This will involve a reallocation of resources used in the production of the concerned
goods which include factors of production such as labor. The reallocation of resources following
the new incentive structure created by adjustment policies will bring about employment shifts
from non-tradables towards importables and exportables.
On the other hand, the evidence for this propositionis not as conclusive as may be
expected. This is because growth in output in the tradables sector can also be possibly brought
about by the re.allocationof resources other than labor. I-Iortonet al. (1991) further noted that
changes in relative wages due to adjustment policies are even more difficult to predict with
certainty. In particular weak labor demand may lead to changes in formal/informal relative
wages, and changes in relative wages by skill or education group, which may crosscut changes
in sectoral relative wages. However, given these qualifications, employment shifts from non-
tradables towards tradables and changes in relative wages yield important information on the
impact of adjustment policies on the labor markets.
An important phenomenon is the change in labor participation rates and the growth of
the informal sector. Horton et al. (1991) distinguished between the added or the discouraged
worker effect and considered which will predominate. The added worker effect occurs when
the fall in income during recessions causes households to increase labor supply in order to at
least maintain their current level of consumption. The discouraged worker effect is observed
when the fall in wage rates during recessions induce households to reduce labor supply. One
qualification that may be made, however, is that the "discouraged" workers may seek
employment in the informal sector where there is relative ease of entry and exit. They do not
reduce their labor supply but compote with those already in the informal sector. Thus, the
weak labor demand in the formal sector causes lay offs which force labor to seek self
employment, mostly within the confines of the informal sector. The entry of newly-informal
workers enlarges the parallel sector as they join those already in the sector. There may be
movements between employment and self employment as workers adjust to the changing labor
market demands with corresponding impacts on their level of incomes and consumption.
Following Demery and Allison (1991), we can point out that the impactsof adjustment
policies are transmitted to households and firms depending on their responsiveness to labor
market conditions. Wage rigidities created by such institutions as labor unions, minimum wage
legislation and the political power of the urban working class may, worsen the situation of
declining output and employment as firms choose to retrench workers,or freeze the hiring of new
workers because of the costs that the rigidities entail for the firms: Labor demand falls and
employment and output contract. Those unable to find jobs in the formal sector seek informal
employment in both rural and urban areas, However, one big assumption here iS that wage
rigidities are effective: in the case of minimum wage legislation, it is observed by most, if not
all, of the firms. From another vantage point, the contraction of the goods market has serious
implications on the quantity of labor demanded and supplied, as well as therelative wages in the
labor market.
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The way the labor market behaves has in turn some ramificationsfor the course of
adjustmentin the goods or productmarket. As real wages fall, there may be an incentive to hire
more labor in the expanding sectors. Those, however, who fail to find urban formal
employment may either choose to stay in the urbansector as informal workers or go to the
agriculture sector and cater subsistence farming.
An important dimension of the impacts of adjustment policies working through the labor
markets is the welfare implication of shifts in the composition of output and employment. A
change in the policy environment gives rise to losers and gainers in society. The losers tend to
be owners of fixed factors that are employed in those sectors that will contract as a result of the
adjustmentpolicies. For example, the laborers, especially the older membersof the work force,
may resist the changes broughtabout by the new policy environment. R may be because of the
difficulty of finding a new job which is,compounded by the fact that the retrainingthat they will
have to undergo to be competitive in the new labor market environment is expensive and time-
consuming. Capitalists may also resist the changes in view of their inability to recover
immediately sunk investment costsin sectors that will decline as a consequence of the new policy
environment. It is dear that viewed from this context, adjustment policies and the costs they
impose on economic agents must be,thoroughly undel"stoodfor intelligent policymaking and
government intervention in the market economy.
By the same token, ownersof capital just like labor are affected by the change in ithe
policy environment and the rules of the game. It is recognized that a primary objective of the
adjustment package is to direct the economy as quickly as possible to the growth path with the
least pain or cost possible. The application or implementation of the adjustment policies will
change the incentive structure of the economy and as earlier mentioned, there will be
corresponding shifts in the composition of outputs and utilization of factors of production.
How capitalists are affectedby the changing business and economic environmentand how
they respond or cope with the changes are also as interesting and important issues ito tackle as
labor adjustments. The market ..economy!s engine of growth is private capital and
entrepreneurship and one sure way towards economic stagnation and decay is for capitalists to
lose their desire to invest and produce, real goods and services. One way to assess the impacts
of adjustment policies will be to take a. look into the investment decisions and expectations of
capitalists. :_
Uncertainty,and risk perception: over what adjustment policies entail and ,how the
implementation of adjustment policies sometimes becomes a drawn-out process, dampen the ....
willingness to. invest ,and expose_more risk capital into>new but promising ventures. The
situation is worsened if the executive branch of government decides to implement :apackage of
adjustment policies which has not been the subject of cxmsultationand/or'coordination with the
legislative branch of government, theCongress, Thus, we may havegovernmeatspeaking in
two distinct and mutually exclusive voices which only tend ,toconfuse investors and,discourage
risk taking. A contrary view, however, is that capitalists take.the intramural among these two
branches of government as a givenand then proceed to lobby with both branches to maintain the
protectionist bias of certain policies which are the targets of reform in the adjustment package
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or to secure access to resources which they will need in view of the adjustmentcosts imposed
by the new set of policies.
This is not to say that all adjustment policies will have a dampening effect on investment
decisions. On the contrary, the new set of policies may in fact create an incentive structure for
firms to move into their areas of comparative advantage. In short, efficiency considerations are
introduced by the adjustment package and progressive-minded capitalists take advantage of the
potential offered by new businesses or industrial ventures. More investments into the growth
areas arise and thus, in the final analysis output is enlarged and employment increases. But this
event is a process in time and notwithstanding the fact that there may be clear and tangible gains
in the future, capitalists may be overwhelmed by the inertia of the prolonged protectionist
character of macro and industrial policies. The perverse outcome• may be the resistance to
change not only by the clear losers in different industry groupings but also by those who expect
to gain from the new policy environment! The irony is that the latter group who stands to gain
retreats from the growth path by investing less, adopting a walt-and-see attitude or parking the
investible surplus in non-productive but surely profitable government securities.
If a decline in the level of investments occurs, output and employment contract and this
phenomenon will raise "the political and social costs of adjustment and increases the odds that
the political system will not be able to maintain stable policies and adequate business conditions"
(Blejer and Ize 1989). Uncertainty and apprehension over the political and social costs of
adjustment policies so paralyze investors that they may stop from investing altogether and this
leads to further contraction in output and employment.
The behavior of capitalists is determined to a very great extent by the changes in relative
rewards or in a generic sense, relative prices of capital to labor. Macro adjustment policies
change relative prices and depending on the level of economic development, initial factor
endowments, technology and the characterization of product and factor markets, one factor
becomes more intensively used and rewarded over the other. While there is an impact betw_n
classes of factors (i.e. labor and capital), there is also an impact within a classof factors because
of the heterogeneity that is all too present in the real world. If capital were the factor used
intensively in the production of tradables then it will enjoy bigger rents and consequently, there
will be a reallocation of capital away from the non-tradables into tradables. On the other hand,
if the tradables are the labor-intensive goods, the rewards go to labor. In either case, gainers
and losers surface: gainers will support the adjustment package while losers will ambush or
thwart any attempt to introduce a new policy regime and incentive structure.
Adjustment policieshave short-run and long-run effects on households • and firms.
Budget cuts imposed by the government can have immediate adverse impacts especially if these
are taken from expenditure items like food subsidies. The impacts of other adjustment policies
like trade liberalization are felt by economic agentsin the long run. However, exogenous shocks
continually buffer the economy at the same time that adjustment policies are being implemented.
The simultaneous occurrence of exogenous shocks and an adjustment program makes it difficult
to distinguish the impacts exerted by adjustment policies from those created by the exogenous
shocks. The difficulty in isolating the source of impacts and estimating the extent and magnitude
of such impacts together with the interaction between the shocks and the adjustment policies
21
makes analysis a nightmare. _But,given the rather profound implications of a vacuum in
knowledge about the ramifications of adjustment policies atthe leve! (ke., households andfirms)
where it matters most, an investr_ent in this type of study,is almost,priceless.
2. ImpactsthroughPr(_tuetMarkets ,
This bringsus to an equally important point which Jaas_beenso far only implicitly brought
into the discussion and that is, the impact on the product or goods market which:may _ verified
through a close.r scrutiny of hous_01d and firm behavior in an crab,of adjustment..We are
forewarned, however, by Behrman_and Deolalikar (199,1,p. 292 ) that while economic'_theory
provides a framework for analyzing the links between micro units (i.e, households and firms)
and adjustment policies, the number of such links and their complex interactions make it
virtually impossible to predict a Priori the impact of adjustment policies. In addition, little else
is known about lags in the adjustment process, the complexities of su,bstitu_ionand fe,edba_ both
on a micro and macro level not to mention the adverse implications to intelligent analysis of
limited, and sometimes inappropriate data. The same thought was expressed by Blejer and Chu
(1990) who pointed out that the channels through which adjustment policies affect households
(particularly, the vulnerable groups) are quite intricate and that the observable results may not
reflect the characteristics of the dynamic process through which various policies operate.
Nevertheless, an excursion into the behavior of households and firms in the product market
_g.h,_.,_d of adjustment deserves the undivided attention of researchers.
t.
• A_laSkq_t policies, change the structure of incentives and stimulate the real!ocation of
resources between sectors and activities. Those firms or industries that used to benefit•from the
protection that is now being eliminated in the course of structural adjustment will block such a
course of action. It is understandable because resource reallocation will entail some costs. The
reality is that movement between sectors is not instantaneous and costless. Faj'lure to influence
the course of structural adjustments on the part of protected industries or firms may mean an exit
from a heretofore profitable rentseeking activity. Adjustment policies are intended to introduce
more competition in the different markets and so for efficiency considerations should be
welcome. However, adjustment policies have differential impacts on households as well as
firms. There are vulnerable firms as well as vulnerable,households and it is important to have
this in mind when designing adjustment packages. :
• (
A reason for the vulnerability,of:firms may be their inability to grow and adjust to market
realities in the course of time. Too •oftenprotectionist policies which are supposed to lend them
some measure of strength in the short:term so that they may become competitive and viable in
the long run, served only to ereate_more dependence on and attachment to these protectionist
policies to the detriment of consumers and the competitiveness of the economy's industrial
sector.
Adjustment policies impact on households and firms in the product market channel through
relative price changes. Expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing policies change the ratio
of tradable to non-tradable prices. This is an immediate s_gnalto households and firms alike that
the economy has to undertake a different course of action compared to what was done in the pre-
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adjustment period. Households and firms are then forced to take a critical look into _the
resources and skills that may be brought to bear on the new economic environment. In this
regard, a great deal of the reaction and behavior in product markets will depend on the
characterization and organization of production and distribution in the product or goods market.
Monopolistic and oligopolistic firms/industries will be keenly observing the signals sent
by adjustment policies and may cooperate with other groups to resist or deflect the winds of
change. Indeed these fn'ms and workers may share the same objective and the same conviction
to resist or weaken the adjustment package although the latter are motivated differently. The
resistance to change may be due to the threat that adjustment policies impose against the
workers' jobs and sources of livelihood. Workers do not perhaps realize that tbe competitive
nature of adjustment policies will serve them well in the long run as monopolistS_andoligopolists
lose their profitable rentseeking opportunities. Or if workers do realize the long term advantages
of a more competitive business environment, they might consider the short-term pain of losing
jobs and livelihoods as, too much to endure.
3. Impacts through Public Goods and Services
Adjustment programs typically involve belt tightening. Thus, budget cuts are imposed
in order to address the internal imbalance that provides fuel to inflationary pressures. It seems
that the easiest (i.e. less politically threatening) cuts to accomplish are those expenditure items
that belong to the social service category, such as health, education and nutrition and the capital
expenditures ( to some exten0. We qualify budget cuts in capital expenditure items because the
self-Servingcharacter of local politics precludesa drastic reduction in capital outlays. Politicians
must be able to show tangible proof of "service and accomplishments." A more serious reason,
perhaps, for partial cuts only for capital expenditure is that too drastic a cut in these items will
diminish real productive capacity over the long term and bureaucrats are well acquainted with
this. Furthermore, a drastic reduction in public spending for capital goods and other
infrastructure outlays brin_gsadverse impacts because of the immediate shrinking of the local
economy that follows.
The drift of our argument here is that in an era of adjustment the government makes the
difficult choic,e of what expenditure items to cut and what subsidies to withdraw. The first
things that go under the knife are those items that have no strong constituency and these are, as
mentioned before, social service items. However, this view does not seem to square with
reality. Aware of the adverse impacts of budget cuts in social service items on human capital
formation and consequently, on the long term productivity of the population, polieymakers and
bureaucrats have strived to maintain some modest budgetary appropriation for these items.
Politicians are in constant touch with their constituency'who continuously •lobbyfor their own
respective interests. Bureaucrats are also aware through their own information and surveillance
systems of the various demands for maintenance of social service items and respond by
allocating some modest "maintenance" amounts.
The same may be said of various types of subsidies. These expenditure items are
•supposed to compensate those who lose out in the market because of externalities and market
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failure. The subsidies over time,have createddifferentgroups of lobbyists who do not hesitate
to use their political strength to maintainand increase subsidies. Adjustmentpolicies have to
contend with choosing which economic activities and economic ageRtsdeserve the subsidies
because the overall thrustof these policies is to leave to the imperso!ml_rcmrketforces the choice
of what the economy has to produce and consume. This is not to say that subsidies have to be
completely eschewed. On the contrary vulnerable groups if they can be efficiently identified
deserve some form of subsidies in order for them to be able to cope with the new realities
imposed by the marketand eventually to deal directly with the market.
Affected sectors whether these are householdsand firms have various creative ways of
coping with a regime o'fdeclining availabilityof public goods and services. The better equipped
and the politically strongerentities or groups can more,easily appropriatefor themselves the
benefits of scarce public goods m!d,_ervices as the rationing litexature suggests. It is the
vulnerable groups which fail tobenefit from the available public goods_and services because of
their lack of capability to deal direetiy with the changes introducedh)_adjustment policies and
the lack of immediate opportunity,to consume the available public goods or services. These
groups may, be so phy"sk.a!lyxem0ved from the local seats ,of ;government and the
municipality/city that access to public,goods and services is virtually impossible._They also do
not have the political power to influence the distributionof these public goods and services.
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IV. TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS AND HYPOTHESES
This section discusses transmission mechanisms in each selected sector, the major
research issues/hypotheses and possible indicators.
A. SOCIAL SERVICES SECTOR
1. Framework ._nd Transmission Mechanisms
The transmission of the effects of changes in key macroeconomic variables on the welfare
of households indexed by health, nutrition and education outcomes can be structured in a series
of processes and outcomes. To illustrate this we shall go through the series of causations.
Exogenous changes in macroeconomic policies are embodied in changes of key macroeconomic
variables (e.g. interest rates, exchange rates, wages and prices, government revenues and
expenditures). These key macroeconomic variables affect and, in turn are, in several iterations,
affected by the operations of a set of rnaCroeconomic processes, namely: the labor and other
factor markets; the goods and services markets; and the public provision of goods and services.
These macroeconomic processes produce macroeconomic outcomes such as employment, output,
prices, as well as level and distribution of public goods and services. These macroeconomic
outcomes are actually the aggregation of incomes (from wages and returns on other assets) the
households earn and the prices (both of money price and time price) households face in trying
to translate incomes as well as available public goods and services into desired household
outcomes. This translation goes through intrahousehold processes involving decisions over
allocation of goods, services and time both for current and future needs of individual members.
Social sector outcomes are products of human capital production decisions of the
households involving health inputs (health service utilization, sanitation), dietary/nutrient intake
and school participation. These decisions are done in the context of prior and/or concurrent
choices other household choices such as fertility and family size, work participation of family
members and migration of the household or family members. From these decisions emerge
social sector outcomes in terms of health, nutrition and education status of households and the
individual members.
A distinct peculiarity of the relationships in the social sector is that the link between
prices and incomes and social sector outcomes is rarely direct. These relationships almost
always go through a web of intervening processes. Consequently, the strength (weakness) of
the intermediate relationships determine whether the impact is magnified (dissipated) as it goes
through the series of mediation processes.
The final point that has to be raised is that given that changes in macroeconomic policies
act together with a host of other change agents, the analysis shall net out the effect of specific
macroeconomic adjustment policies from the impact of other sources of change concurrently
affecting human capital outcomes.
25
In terms of categorizing differential effects of macroeconomic.adjustment policies on
social sector outcomes at least two modalities are identifyable: First, theimpact of changes in
key macroeconomic variables will vary depending on type of household (rich vs. poor, urban
vs. _ral)_ on the type of income (wages vs. return to land_capiml), on_the components of the
total price (money 1_c¢ vs. time price), ,andby individual,member(s)of househ_d_ (husband
vs. wife, children vs. adults, _males vs. females). Second, the differential effects is dependent
onthe natu_ of the processes involved and the extent of participati_ of householdsinthese
processes. In particular, the differential effects is manifested in terms of: (1.)_whosehealth is
affected (children vs. adults, ,males vs. females) and the_causes Of morbidity:or mortality
(communicable vs..degenerative diseases); (2) whose nutritionalstatus ;is affected_(child_envs.
adult, males vs. females) and tho_typvof nutritional deficiency involved.(dietary insufficiency
vs micro-nutrientdeficiency; and (3) whose schoofing is affected (males vs. females, younger
vs. older siblings) and the type of schooling affected (formal vs. informal, basic vs. higher
education).
Impacts Through the Labor Market
Three major mechanisms can.be identified through which ad)ustment programs affect
social sector outcomes through the labor market.
First, the wage rate is the opportunity cost of time. The cost of accessing social sector
services, particularly, health services, includes the cost of waiting in the queue for the service.
The higher the wage ram, th_ higher,is the cost of waiting_therefore, thehigher is the total cost
of the service. Any adjustment program that will affect:the wage rate will affect the utilization
rates of health services and eventually health sector outcomes.
Second, social sector expenditures are human capital investments which feeds back to the
labor market in teams of increases in labor productivity. In turn, human capital investment
decisions of households respondto relative rewards in the labor market. Adjustment programs
that alter relative returns in the labor market will affect human capital investment decisions of
households, hence, also affect social sector outcomes.
Third, wages (and returns to other assets) form part of income and private expeditures
on nutrition, health, and education are determined by income just like any other expenditure.
Adjustment programs that alter wages (and returns of assets) will alter household income,
therefore, will also affect choices of:household over expenditures on human capital inputs.
Impacts Through the Goods Market
Social sector expenditures !'equire material inputs, i.e. paper and ,pencil for education,
medicines for health, and food for nutrition. Adjustment programs that affects the prices (or the
supply given the demand) of these goods will affect social sector OUtcomes. FOr instance, a
devaluation will affect the price of_medicines since either the compoundsused in the manufacture
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of medicines or the whole formulation is imported. This can also trigger a series of substitution
possibilities with varying impacts on health outcomes.
To the extent that relative prices mean varying incomes, social sector outcomes will be
affected depending on the way the private spending on health, education and food respond as a
result of declining (increasing) growth of incomes. In addition, changes in relative prices trigger
substitution between related goods. For instance, studies reviewed by Behrman and Deolalikar
(1988) provide evidence of positive income-compensated food price effects on nutrient intake,
reflecting a strong substitution among foods with different nutrient contents. Thus, when the
price of a particular food item increases, the household may shift demarid to other relatively
nutritious foods so that the decrease in nutrient intake from the food item whose price increased
may be more than offset by an increase in nutrient intake from the substituted foods.
Impacts Through the Provision of Public Services
A considerable proportion of social sector services and goods is provided by the
government. Adjustment programs then that call for, say, reduction in budget deficit will have
profound impacts on social sector outcomes. To pursue this example, take note that this
intermediate policy objective of reducing the budget deficit can be achieved either by reducing
government expenditures or by increasing tax revenues, or both. The increase in tax revenues
could be achieved by increasing the tax rates or by improving tax compliance. Each of these
policy instruments can have different impacts on the incomes of and prices facing different
households. Suppose the means taken is to reduce government expenditures. The effect of this
on households would depend on the nature of the expenditure cut, both on what is reduced and
how it was reduced. Suppose further that the decision is to reduce expenditures for social
services, in particular health, more than the other components of government expenditures. The
effect of this reduction would again depend on both the extent of the cut and the manner of the
cut. If, for example, expenditures for drugs and transportation allowances of field workers are
reduced more than the other components of the health budget, then the price (total cost) of health
services facing poor households in rural areas is likely to increase more than the cost of health
services facing rich households in urban areas.
Differential Impacts by Different Income Groups
Different income groups will likely have different spending propensities on human capital
inputs. Therefore, in addition to the general response to increases (decreases) in income is the
differential effects due to different behaviour by income class.
Figure 5 shows estimates of expenditure elasticities of health care expenditures by
income quartile and type of health care expenditures based on the 1985 FIES. This information
tells us that changes in the incomes of the low income households are likely to result in
proportionately larger expenditures for medical, dental and hospital services than changes in the
incomes of high income groups. One could use this information to infer that macroeconomic
adjustment policies that adversely (favorably) affect the incomes of low income groups are lilly
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to result in significant adverse (favorable) effects on the health status of the population (through
reductions in health care expenditures) than if the effects of policies favor only income changes
among higher income groups.
Figure 6 shows estimates of predicted probabilities of using health facilities by income
quartile based on the 1987 National Health Survey. The data suggest that lower income groups
tend to use public health facilities while higher income groups tend to use private health
facilities. Thus the pattern of health facility use is likely to change with the pattern of income
change generated by macroeconomic adjustment policies. A decrease in real incomes due to the
short term effects of adjustment policies could lead to greater use of public health f_icilities. This
could possibly increase waiting time for serv1_ and reduce the quality of health service in public
facilities, especially if public budgets for health are not increased to deal with such increased
levels of utilization.
Data on enrollment rates by age of child and household income in both rural and urban
areas obtained from the Household and School Matching Survey of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 reveal that enrollment rates are lower
among poorer households than higher income households. This is true for each age group of
children in both urban and rural areas. Enrollment rates in rural areas, however, are lower than
in urban areas in each income decile particularly for older children age 11 to 16 years, What this
information suggests for us is that the impact of macroeconomic adjustment policies on
educational performance would depend in part on whose household's income are being affected
more than others.
The Role of the Interaction Among Social Sector Outcomes
It is well known that better nutrition and health status results in better performance in
school (e.g. Selowsky and Taylor 1973). Thus, a policy that promotes better nutrition will also
improve educational outcomes. Likewise, better educational outcomes generate better nutrition
and health outcomes, hence, will have similar implications.
Impacts in the Subsequent Rounds Due to Changes in Human Capital Outcomes
As mentioned above, social sector outcomes alters labor productivity. Adjustment
programs that affect social sector outcomes will then have effects not only on the current round
but also in subsequent rounds as well.
2. Major Issues
There were several studies undertaken to understand the determinants of socioeconomic
outcomes (Herrin and Bautista 1989 for health; Herrin 1990 for nutrition; and Paqueo 1987 for
education). Although most of the studies were not done in the context of analyzing the impacts
of macroeconomic adjustment policies, they can provide a basis for identifying and firming up
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knowledge on key processes. What follows are the major issues attendant to the analysis of the
impact of macroeconomic adjustment policies on social sector outcomes that require empirical
validation.
Income, Prices, Contextual Variables and Health Outcomes. Incomes and prices affect
health status through their impact on health care utilization and exposure to environmental
contamination, among others, and these are compounded by nutritional status and initial
demographic and social characteristics of households (such as family size and education of
mothers).
Income and Health Expenditures Elasticities. Given the proportionately larger expenditure
elasticities of health care expenditures by low income households, one can infer that
macroeconomic adjustment policies that adversely (favorably) affect the incomes of low income
groups are likely to result in significant adverse (favorable) effects on the health status of the
population (through reductions in health care expenditures) than if effects of policies favor only
income changes among higher income groups.
Income and Public Health Facilities Utilization. Given that lower income groups tend to
use public health facilities while higher income groups tend to use private health facilities, a
decrease in real incomes due to the short term effects of adjustment policies could lead to greater
use of public health facilities. This could possibly lead to an increase in waiting time for service
and reduce the quality of health service in public facilities, especially if public budgets for health
are not increased to deal with such increased levels of utilization.
Price Effects on Service Utilization. There is the continuing concern for robust estimates
of price elasticities of service utilization. Previous studies show that outpatient, delivery and
other primary care are not very sensitive to income, money prices or time prices (Akin et al.
1984; Schwartz, et al.. 1988). The 1981 National Health Survey, however, revealed substantial
price elasticities of outpatient care for children, and that the price elasticities are higher at lower
income levels than at higher income levels (Ching 1991).
Income Effect on Nutritional Status: The Role of Various Filters. A review of
determinants of nutritional status suggests that while poverty or low income is often considered
as the "major root cause" of malnutrition, increases in income amongthe malnourished group
alone to close the nutrition gap is not feasible nor acceptable. The reason behind this finding
is the fact that the link between income and nutritional status consists of several intervening
links. Bouis and Haddad (1990) estimates implied that the doubling of income improves
preschooler's nutritional status by only 5 percent. This conclusion was derived from the
following estimated elasticities representing the strength of relationship of each link: (1) income
and food expenditures, 0.65; (2) food expenditures and household calorie intake, 0.17; (3)
household calorie intake and preschooler's calorie intake, 1.18; and (4) preschooler's calorie
intake and preschoolers nutritional status, 0.39. The net nutritional status elasticity with respect
to income is estimated by multiplying the individual elasticities for each link: (0.65) (0.17)
(1.18) (0.39) = (0.05). There is then a strong case for direct nutrition interventions that serve
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to strengthen various links. Such intervention will invariably include nutritioneducation, focused
health interventions, and family planning.
Price Effect on Nutritional Status. Studies reviewed by Behrman and Doelalikar (1988)
provide evidence of positive.ineome_compensatedfood pri_ effect_ or_nutrientintake, reflecting
a •strOngsubstitution among foods Withdifferent nutrient contents.
In studies conducted in the Philippines, Bouis and Ha&lad <,1990)fred no significant
effect of price of rice or corn on household calorie intai_; .while Oamia and Pinstrup-Andersen
(1987) fred household calorie consumption with respect to price of. rice to be only -0.02. This
latter finding implies that a doubling of the price of rice results in a reduction in household
calorie consumption of only 2 percent.
Income and School Participation. Data from: the H_usehOld SehOoiand Matching
Survey reveal that enrollment: ratesar¢ lower am_ag'p0orer households than higher income
households. This is true for each age group of children in both urban an_rural areas.
Enrollment in rural areas, however, are lower than 'in urban areas in each income decile
particularly for older children age 11 to 16 years. Small area samplesurvey results suggest that
part of the relationship between household income and school participation of children is due to
the greater participation of these children in both paid and unpaid work in order to supplement
household income. Such a household survival strategy, Of course, has tl/e unintended effect of
reducing school participation and eventual schooling,attainment of children in *,hesehouseholds
relative to other children (Herrin 1992). •
Adjustment Policies and Regional Disparity in Health OutcomeS.There is th_;iiiierest on
whether, and to what extent, macroeconomic adjustment policies can adversely (favorably) affect
economic activities and incomes of some regions more than others, and whether such differential
impact widen (narrow) regional mortality differentials as well as th0_ of the different subgroups
of the population.
In assessing the impact of macroeconomic policies, the impact should be measureo
relative to some bases. Since, laboratory experiments are not possible, finding out and
comparing the effects on human capital outcomes of alternative sets of macroeconomic policies
is the feasible research strategy. In this regard, the use of simulation models to assess
counterfactuals is suggested. ' ....
3. Indicators
The indicators for analyzing the impact of mae.,roe_nomicadjustment policies'on social
sector outcomes can be grouped into:three: (1) econOmic outcomes facing households, (2)
household choices, and O) human capital outcomes.
Economic Outcomes Facing Households
1. Income (returns to labor and other assets)
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by source (wage,rent,interest,profit)
by type of household
by family member contributing
2. Prices (total cost to an individual or household goods and _services)
by type of cost and other influences (money price, transport cost, travel
time, waiting time for services; insurance coverage, scholarships and
tuition subsidies, food subsidies)
by type of household
by household member affected
Household Choices
1: Human Capital production, inputs
Health service utilizati'on (preventive and curative)
Sanitation
Dietary/Nutrient intake
School participation
2. Other Choices
- Fertility and family size
- Work participation of tamily members
- Migration of household or family members
Human Capital Outcomes
1. Health
- Mortality
- Morbidity
2. Nutrition
- Growth failure
- Micronutrient deficiency
3. Education
- Literacy and functional literacy
- Schooling attainment
- School achievement
Many of these indicators are already available. The gap lies on the fact that since these
require different data gathering methodologies, these are gathered in different household surveys,
hence, in different points in time. Therefore, an integrated analysis that MIMAP requires is
difficult to undertake.
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B. NATURAL RF..SOURCEg_AND ENVIRONMENT SECTOR
1. Framework and Tra_smissiqn Mechanisms
The impact of the adjustment policie_ on the natural resources and environment (NRE)
sector can be assessed in two levels: at the macroeconomic level since the country is heavily
dependent on natural resources for its survival and growth, and at the household and firm level
since a large segment of the population is directly or indirectly dependent on the natural
resources for subsistence and livelihood. The MIMAP analysis focuses on the latter without
necessarily ignoring the importance of the former.
There are two groups of resource users, namely the formal or commercial group and the
informal or subsistence group, who will be affected by macroeconornic adjustment Policies in
varying degrees and direction. The welfare impacts of macroeconomic adjustment policies on
the two groups of resource users pass through two levels of channels. In particular, they affect
prices of inputs and resource outputs as well as the availability of technology and public goods
(first level), which, in turn, affect the rate of resource depletion and/or
degradation/replenishment (second level), which ultimately affect the welfare Of formal and
informal resource users. Institutional factors could also affect the rate of resource depletion.
For instance, shorter security of lease tenure encourages faster rate of resource depletion and
discourages resource replenishment. The welfare status of resource users may have a feedback
effect on the rate of resource depletion. For instance, resource users who are adversely affected
by policies may intensify resource extraction to maintain a certain level of income_
2. M_jor Issues/Hypotheses
There have been changes in macroeconomic policies over the years..Some w_e intended
to affect directly the natural resource and environment sector, while Othersproduced unintended
effects on the sector. There were sectoral policies that directly addressed some aspects of the
natural resource and environment sector. However, very little empirical work had been done
quantifying the impacts of these policies on resource depletion. Going through the framework
discussed above, one can hypothesize the impacts of maeroeconomic policies on resource
depletion through certain transmission channels. This is shown in Table 8.
A distinction is made in terms of whether the inputs and outputs are tradeable or
non-tradeable. The different policies considered are changes in the level of government
expenditures and taxes, investment incentives, money supply, devaluation, and trade controls.
It should be noted that there are' _several situations where ambiguity in the anticipatlxl impacts
emerge, while certain definitiveness can be said about impact of certain policies on rate of
depletion.
Policies with inflationary impacts, such as increases in money supply and government
expenditures and decreases in general taxes, cause the aggregate demand to increase.
Subsequently, employment is increased in the formal sector which may cause the nominal wage
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Table 8
PREDICTED IMPACT OF MACROECONOMIC POLICIES ON
RELATIVE PRICES AND THE RATE OF DEPLETION
(.
.............................................................................. - ....................
Domestic Price Of
.........................................................
PoLicy Output Inputs Capitat Labor Interest Rates Rate of
................................... , DepLetionT NT T NT
...................................................................................................
increase in G 0 + 0 + + + +/-
increase in TX 0 0 - - + +/.
increase in HS 0 + 0 + - +
Deva tuat i on + 0 + + ? 0 ? +
Trade Taxes +/- 0 +/- 0 0 0 ?
Investment
Incent i yes 0 + 0 + 0 ? +
...................................................................................................
Note: T Tradeabtes (+) - increase
NT - Non tradeabLes (0) - no change
(-) - decrease (?) * uncertain change
Tx - Tax
HS - Honey SUppLy
Source: NeLson (198/,)
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rate to increase, thus, eventually causing an inflow of labor from the informal sector. The
general increase in the price level is however expected to be more than the increase in the
nominal wage rate, thus, causing real wage rate to decrease. Inflationary policies have the
overall impact of increasing the general price level of both nontradeable inputs and outputs. The
prices of tradeables are not expected to change, however, because they are determined by world
prices. For the informal resource users who are confronted by high prices of consumer goods
but who may not experience a wage increase even if there is increased demand for labor in the
formal sector on account of the labor surplus situation in the country, it is expected that more
pressure will be put on the resource which cause faster resource depletion. To this people, the
natural resources offer a way out of the economic difficulties which are created by inflationary
changes in government economic policies.
Note, however, that the pressure on the resource coming from the formal sector may
have an opposite effect. In particular, if the firms are producing tradeables, the price may
remain the same since these prices are determined in the world market. The prices of inputs
(nontradeable intermediate inputs and labor), are however, higher and these are translated in
increased cost of production. As a result, a lower rate of depletion from the formal sector may
be realized.
Changes in money supply, tax and government expenditures can also alter the nominal
rate of interest which in turn affects the cost of production, especially those of the capital
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intensive industries. Policies which decrease the nominal interest rate include fncreases in
money supply and decreases in government expenditures. These policies are expected to reduce
the nominal interest rate in the short run but, in the long run the inflationary effects of increased
money supply may cause nominal rate of interest to increase.
Given a capital intensive resource-based industries, a higher rateof interest increases the
costs of operation of the firm. With a higher cost of production/extraction, it is expected that
resource extraction activities will be reduced. On the other hand, policies which reduce the
interest rate, such as provision of cheap credit, makes it profitable for the firms to employ more
capital, thus, hastening the rate of depletion of natural resources.
Other macroeconomicpolicy instruments used by the government to correct for economic
imbalances include those of the exchange rate and certain foreign trade policies. F.,xchangerate
controls cause the domestic currency to be overvalued. With an overvalued domesti'¢currency,
the prices of nontradeables become expensive relative to tradable items. This has the effect of
raising production of nontradeables, increasing domestic consumption of the lower-priced
tradeables, and reducing exports. In addition, the relatively cheaper foreign currency encourages
greater consumption of imported items. The expected impact on resource depletion of an
overvalued exchange rate is to reduce depletion, assuming that bulk of the natural resource
products are tradeables.
In the case of trade taxes, the rate of depletion will be affected only if outputs and/or
inputs are traded in the foreign market. With export taxes, the prices of exportables are reduced
while import taxes raise the price of importables. The ultimate impact of trade taxes in general
is to reduce the rate of resource depletion since they worsen the terms of trade faced by the
exporting countries.
Still another set of policy instrument is investment incentives, may take the form of
reduced tariffs on imported inputs, exemption from income taxes and related privileges, and
reduced or subsidized interest rates. As a whole, these policies tend to raise the capital intensity
of the firm which redounds to lower cost of production. With lower cost of production, faster
depletion of the resource is expected to happen.
The analysis can be extended further by looking at the impact of sector-specific policies
on relative prices and resource depletion. In the forestry sector, the different sectoral adjustment
policies which figure prominently within the last two decades are presented in Table 9. Shown
also in the same table are the expected impact of these various policies on the rate of forest
depletion. Like the various macroeconomic adjustment policies, changes in resource use can
come about through changes in the relative prices of outputs and inputs.
Given the growing concern for the environm_t, most or all of these policies were
formulated with the end goal_of limiting re_urce depletiol_. By affecting output and input
prices, the profitability of ex_tio n to the firm is reduced and lower extraction rate may ensue,
other things being equal. ,The same effect of achieving sustainable level of resource use is
expected with the government's Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP). In particular, the
provision of long term leases or stewardship contracts to resource users will hopefully create in
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Table 9
PREDICTED IMPACT OF FOREST MANAGEMENT POLICIES
ON RELATIVE PRICES AND THE RATE OF FOREST DEPLETION
...................................................................................................
Domestic Price Of
Poticy output Inputs Capitat Labor Discount Rates Rate of
................................... I)eptetion
T NT T NT
Log Export Ban - 0 0 0 0 ?
Logging Ban - - 0 0 0 0 ? -
Harvest Fees - 0 0 0 0 ? -
(incl envt' t
fee & taxes)
=...
Export Taxes 0 0 0 + 0 ?
Long Term
Leases 0 0 0 0 0 0
!rives tment
Incent i yes 0 0 0 0 ? +
ISFP 0 0 -/0 0 ?
...................................................................................................
Note: T - Tradeab[es (+) - increase
HT - Non tradesbles (0) - no change
(-) - decrease (?) - uncertain change
Source: Netson (1984)
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them the incentive to protect and manage the resource in a sustainable manner since their future
is also at stake. In effect, a secure long term lease agreement reduces the private rate of time
preference or discount rate.
It is also worth noting that different types of resource users may react or be affected
differently by the same economic policies. Take the case of the small upland farmers or
and those of the logging firms. For the kaingineros, increased government
expenditures or other expansionary economic policies which create a general increase in prices
will harm them most, since forest product prices are not expected to increase in the same
proportion as the other consumer products. To cope with this general increase in prices, the
kainginer.os are expected to put more pressure on the resource through .more intensive
cultivation.
It is possible, however, that the increase in the nominal wage rate, especially in the
formal sector may lure upland dwellers to join the formal economy labor force. As a result,
there will be less pressure on the _esource that will be coming from the informal sector. This
mobility of labor, though, is unlikely in a developing country like the Philippines due to both
the constraints on skills possessed by upland farmers and the problem of dislocating them once
they have settled their families in a given upland area.
37
, Tebte 10
' •::PR,EDL_3TED:IMPACTOF MINING AND MINERAL MANAGEMENT --
POLICIES,ONRELATIVE PRICES:AND THE RATE ,OF MINERAL EXHAUSTION
Domestic Price Of
Policy Output -L_J I nl_J_tS Capitat Labor l _ t = of
................................... Exhaustion
T NT T NT
Production
Assistance 0 + 0 + + +
Price Controls 0 + 0 + 0 0 +
Export InC. + 0 0 0
Domestic Taxes - 0 0 +
Investment + 0 - 0 0 +
Incent i ves
Note: T - TradeabLes (+) - increase
NT - Non tredeabtes (0) - no change
(-) - decrease (?) -'uncertain change
source: Adopted from Nelson (1984)
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For commercial loggers, the rate of depletionmay even decrease on account of the high
cost of production brought about by higher prices of inputs. As mentioned earlier, since most
natural resource products are tradeable, their prices are not expected to increase with
expansionary policies of the government. The net effect on rate of depletion of policies which
increase aggregate demand is, therefore, ambiguous.
The net effect of increased money supplyis also ambiguous since while,the.inflationary
impact of such a policy may reduce rate of depletion by the •loggingfirms, the lower rate of
interest inducedby the high supply of money makes capital inexpensive. This_has the effect of
encouraging greater resource extraction activities in the forestry sector.
,_...
The different economic policies in the mining sectors are likewise summarized in Table'
10 with thei_l__ impact on relative prices and on m_ lof depletion. Note that theIdifferent
sector specifte policies in themining_andmineral-basedl!indusLriesare l_ conducive to increased
rate of depletion. This is not surprising at all since the country relies heavily on_this sector for
the much needed foreign currency required to fuel the cOuntry's economic growth.
The dominant policies instituted in the fishery sector are shown in Table 11. While
many policies in the fishery sector are considered as having negative effect of resource
depletion, the evidence of resource overfishing tells us that these policies were not quite effective
in curtailing fishing activities. The difficulty of enforcing the regulatory policies of the
government due to both limited resources available to the government for enforcement and the
large coastal resources of the country make it difficult.for the central government to limit open
access to the nation's coastal resources. As a responseto this observed ineffectiveness of the
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Table 11
PREDICTED IMPACT OF COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT POUCIES ON RELATIVE PRICES
AND THE RATE OF FISHERY RESOURCE OEPLETION _
............................................. - .......................................
Domestic Price Of
PoLicy Output Inputs Capital Labor Rate of
................................... Depl et i on
T NT T NT
Export Bans - 0 0 0 0
0porat ion & 0 0 0 0
Harvest Re-
gulations
Export Taxes 0 0 0 0 0
Export 0 0 O 0 0 0 +
! ncent i ves
Investment 0 0 0 0 +
! ncent i yes
Control of 0 0 0 0
Fishing
Effort
Credit Program + 0 0 0 +
1
Note: T - Tradesbles (+) "- increase
NT - Non tradeabtes (0) - no change
(-) - decrease (?) uncertain change
Source: Adopted from Nelson (198/,)
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cunv.xit system_ the government is slowly decentralizing management,of these coastal resources.
The impact of output price, input prices and other variables on the rate of forest
depletion, in which data are available, were examined using regression analysis (Table 12). The
results confirm the hypothesis that output and input prices negatively affect the rate of forest
deforestation. What is notable in the result is that the estimated elasticity coefficient of output
prices is higher than those of input prices. This means that favorable output prices must •have
accounted for a significant portion of the rapid rate of deforestation that had, taken place in' the
country. It implies that policies affecting output prices of resources, such as those presented, in
Tables 8 to 11 have larger impact on the .rate of deforestation.
3. Possible Indicators
There are various studies trying to link the rate of resource depletion to welfare, levels
of households directly affected by the depletion. Although they have used various'indicators of
resource depletion and household welfare, some commonality with respect to certain indicators
can be observed. In the forestry sector, resource depletion indicators used are_ rate of
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deforestation, declining productivity of ' " _ "
the resource base and theshifting from r,,b_1_
one resource type (e.g., cropland)to RESULT OF LOG-LINEAR REGRESS!ON
another (e.g., public forest) in their
searchfor alternativesourcesof income, DeterminantsC0e'fficient Levelof
Welfare impact variables include level of si_ni*icenee
farm income, income distribution .......................................... ....
through some,measures such as Gini ,.tput price 0.767 .01
coefficient, indebtedness_ mobility to interest - 0.310 .05
other places or income SOUrceS, rest .age - 0.084 .05
proportion of one's income spent on
food, and increasedtechnicalknowledge, initial stock 2.77 .01
All of these will presumably,affect the i,terc_t. -15._:
level and consumption mix of goods, and ..............................................Furctionat Fern:
servicesof the householdS; Deforeststion = f(levet of,, initial stock; real wage
rate, interest rate and price.of output)
For the fishery sector, the Rz=0.._
depletion indicatorsare declining :cateh_ =j, az =0.9s1
per unit effort, increasing conflicts
among users, increased use of destructive methods and increasing efforts spent to catch a given
size of harvest. Welfare impact.variables are more or less similar in the _caseof the fishery
sector.
For.the raising,sector, depletion is not really a concern at the household level. Welfare
indicators of,_,hoaseholds within mining communities, also inelud_level of income and-
employment, access to basic services and public utilities provided by tl_ mining firms. For
those households affected !_, effluent discharges of these firms, welfare;impact indicators may
include reduced productivitTand income, health expenditures, labor,displacement, and loss of
properties.
Most of the studies linking resource depletion to welfare of households are descriptive,
and therefore cannot tell us the strength of the linkage. This is one researclr area .where the
MIMAP research may be directed.
C. .AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
1. Frameworkand TransmissiorL_Mechanisms
_mce me t_tsus'me government has_pursued,a package of_stabilization'and._tructural
adjustment policies thatare intended to correct serious :imbalances in, the fiscal and external
accounts, ensure price stability and lay the long-term basis for growth and development.
Financial, Wadeand exchange rate policy reforms have been introdueedbut with limited success
as the economy faced implementation problems and the 1983 balance of payments crises which
led to negative growth in succeeding years.
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The change of government in 1986 opened the way for more policy reform measures.
In the trade account, the import liberalization program which started in the early 1980s but
which was suspended during the 1983 crisis, was resumed in 1986. Between 1982 and 1990
about 2,462 items were liberalized. The government further committed to liberalize 323 items
of the remaining 493 restricted items before 1994, except those used in industries which require
a longer period within which to modernize and expand investments. Part of the trade reform
was the use of the tariff instead of quantitative restrictions for industrial protection. For
instance, Executive Order 470 which was issued on August 24, 1991, provides for a final tariff
rate structure of 3%, 10%, 20% and 30%. A parallel tier of 5%, 15%, 25% and 50% is
provided for a few selected items.
The government also pursued reforms in tax policy, exchange rate policy and monetary
and financial policy. The most significant of the tax policy reform package is the adoption of
the value-added tax (VAT) starting in 1988. Executive Order 276 levied a 10% VAT on the
production and sale of all goods and services except agricultural products, exportable products
and petroleum sector products.
These macro-economic reforms have significant impact on the economy. Economic
theory suggests that the immediate outcome of the trade, exchange rate and fiscal policy reforms
is more efficiency in the economy. But whether indeed this is the outcome of policy reforms
is an empirical matter. It would be difficult to state with certainty the impact of policy reforms
without an investigation of the transmission channels through which impacts are exerted on
economic agents. As pointed out earlier, adjustment policies impact on economic agents through
(a) relative prices; (b) incomes or purchasing power and (c) access (or lack ofi0 to resources,
like public goods. Thus, adjustment policies change the incentive structure and redirect the flow
of resources among sectors and activities. Those sectors that were beneficiaries of protectionist
policies will experience resource outflows in the course of implementation' of policy, reforms.
Indeed, the seriousness given by the government to the implementation of policy reforms is a
strong signal to resource owners and users that the economy will undertake a different economic
path.
2. Major I.ssues/Hypotheses
There is a dearth of studies which determine empirically the impacts of macroeconomic
adjustment policies on agriculture. The existing studies, such as those of Lee (1984) and
Medalla (1986), had focused on the impact of changes in the tariff structure on the economy.
Those which tried to examine the role of trade policies in influencing agricultural development
(Azarcon 1987; Seligman 1987) were mostly descriptive. More recent attempts by Clarete
(1989,1991) gave some quantitative estimates of the impact of tariff reforms on Philippine
agriculture but these addressed mainly the resotirce allocation issues.' A more disaggregated
analysis of the micro impacts of tariff or trade policy reforms, for example, the effects on
income distribution, has yet to be done. Nevertheless, we report here the initial attempts to
quantify the impacts of trade policy reforms 6n agriculture although the focus of these studies
is on resource allocation.
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Using a CGE model bfth_ Philippine economy,' Clarete (1989).found out that although
the tariff reforms yielded positive real income gains to the _onomy resources moved out of
agriculture towardsnon-agriCulture. This is because agricultural tariff protection came down
faster and deeper than non-agricultural tariff protection. This exacerbates ;the alreadyVerylow
effective tariff protection given to agriculture vis-a-vis manufactt_ring as documented by Baatista
et al. (1979). On the recent tariff reforms two studies were done (Clarets 19910 and 1991b).
Executive Order 413 was issued in 1990 to cut furthex the tariff protection in the economy.
While the reforms were beneficial, these would have meant substantial revenue losses. EO 413
was suspended following some objections from the private sector and in itsplace Executive
Order 470 was issued.
Clarete found out that EO 470 tariff reforms moved the economy towards more efficiency
but this would depend on the manner the government manages the exchange'rate following these
reforms. If the exchange rate were unresponsiveto the increasing trade deficits then a severe
balance of payments problem which might lead to rationing of foreign exehange_ wilt cancel the
real income gains arising from
the tariff reforms. Table 13
shows the effects of the tariff ' " '' . ,,
reforms under a flexible exchange
rate policy. In particular, in the rabls 13
agriculture sector the production LOCAL PRODUCTION EFFECTS OF E.O. 470 TARIFF REFORMS
of crops and ,other primary (In Percent|
commodities increases slightly,,.
More crops, livestock and fishery _det sector Benchmark.Data
products are produced. Forestry (i. thousand,
uni is)
and mining also came out as
gainers in resource. As a whole 1 .Crop_ 151,e03,000 0.16
2 Livestock and Paul.try 1,533,400_ 0.09
primary sectors tend to expand, 3 Fishery 61,939,_00 O.Z6
because of the tariff reforms and 4 ForestryandLogging 18,L_68,500 0.17
5 Hining ;_3,349_Z00 1. 0
the crops sector,being the largest e cec=_ut_ v_. oil _,f, 46',0t_,000 0:_°
7 Animal Fee(_ N_facturin9 25,722,300 -0.14
of thesesectors, stands to gain 8 Food,Beverages'&Tobacco 263,769:,000 0.12
the most resources. On the 9 Text. App.,Ft,r &.Leather B9,379_000 1.10
10 Wood,Paler & Ib_ber 64,844,800 0.49
other hand, the output of the 11Chemicals 42,778,100 -0.17
manufacturing sector would also lZ.Petroleum Refineries 43,342,800 -0.9113 Non-metallic min. Prods. 14,105,200 0.18
increase:as a, result of the tariff .14 Basic getat inck_tries "33,,052t000t, 0.79
reforms. Food, beverages and iS Fabricatedgetat Products 14,;_45,200: -0.3210' Nachinery exc. electrical 7,644,080 0.30
tobacco are expected to expand. 17ElectriCal Nachtnery, 35,3,29,B00 _4.Z5
18 Transport Equipment 4,020,080 -0.37
However, the f_ds production 19 _scettaneous gana_actures 6,589,$70 -1.03
will go down but this loss is 20Services 764,300,000 -0,34
more than offset by the gains in ..... '
resources in food,beverages and Source: ctarete (1_1b); Tebte10.
tobacco as well as: in vegetable
oils and fats sectors, ....... """
The CGE a_d¢l_was:_se_,once more to quanuzy me zmpact or the veaue-aaoea'mx _v AT)
on agricultural processing. Clar_ showed that the VAT inadvertently taxes the value-added
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IIII IIII I I I
in agro-processing more
than in the rest of the Table14
economy. This is because SIMPLE AVERAGE VAT RATES BY
the VAT law exempts the KEYSECTORS(%)
primary agricultural sector sook Effective PercentRate Rate Deviation
whose products are
substantially used in agri- Primry Sectors 1.85 2.12 2.63Agricutturat Processing 10.00 22.28 122.81
processing activities. Thus, Industry 9.35 12.36 29.92
agro-processors who Services 10.00 12.55 ,25.49
purchase primary
II I I I II II
agricultural products as raw
materials can not claim a tax credit supposedly equal to the cost of the VAT on the materials.
The net effect is to discourage investment and resources from moving into agro-processing.
Agricultural processing has the highest effective VAT rate of 22.28% followed by the services
sector. The effective VAT rate for the non-agricultural processing sectors is not substantially
higher than 10% (Table 14). This is because the proportion of VAT-exempt intermediate inputs
in these other sectors is small compared to the same proportion in agro-processing.
The estimation attempts show that macroeconomic policy reforms have positive impacts
on the allocation and use of resources in the economy. However, there are outstanding issues
that still must be addressed immediately. An important area that must:be studied is the impact
of policy reforms on agricultural and rural factor markets. Factor owners respond toshifts in
production and labor incentives as signalled by changes in relative rents and wages in factor
markets that are brought about by the adjustment policies. Since the agricultural and rural
economy is a perennial source of migrant labor it will be important to' determine how adjustment
policies create the potential for more employment right in the countryside. More specifically,
we need information not only on the impact of adjustment policies on the production of tradables
and non-tradables both types of commodities which are produced by the agriculture and rural
sector. As the composition of output changes in response to the new incentive structure,
correspondingly employment shifts towards the favored sector. The size of unemployed labor
and the emerging structure of the agricultural labor market are matters of deep concern and must
be thoroughly understood and analyzed.
The adjustment policies also have welfare implications to gainers and losers that arise
because of shifts in composition of output and employment. The current empirical work has
indicated the potential of CGE models in tracking down the effects of macroeconomie l_olicies
on key sectors of the economy. It is noted that the results of the model simulations depend upon
the assumed behavioral parameters of the model which can, however, be econometticaly
estimated. A more disaggregated analysis of He micro impacts of macro policy reforms _will
require a restructuring of the CGE model to incorporate more sectors. The CGE models applied
by Clarete did not examine the distributional impacts of policy reforms but this is something that
cannot be done. There are in fact other models which have tried to incorporate income
distribution concerns in their respective structures ( e.g. see the APEX CGE done by Clarete
and WarT 1992 and Habito 1984). It is interesting that a CGE model of the Philippine economy
now being developed by several local researchers appears sultable for the purpose. In addition,
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the use of a macro-econometric •model which interphases with •the CGE to calculate the short-run
effects of macro economic policy reforms is also suggested. We discuss in the Monitoring
Section of this integrative reportthe modelling problems that have to be solved in this approach.
_.' . ..
3. Interphase of the CGE and Macro,econometric Models
. - ,f,.
Clarete suggests that the core analysis of macroeconomic policies be undertaken using
a CGE model and that a macroeconometric model be used to do side-computations for use in
the CGE simulations. The CGE" models are inappropriate in analyzing the impact of
macroeconomic policies on nominal values such as the nominal exchange rate, the general price
level and nominal gross domestic product. This is where a macroeconometric model will be
used. The interphase between the two models may be focused on the computation of (a) real
exchange rate changes; ' 0a) real interest rate changes and (c) aggregate real economic output.
The macroeconomctric model will Calculate the changes in the nominal values of the general
price level, the nominal exchange rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal gross domestic
product as a Tesult of a given macroeconomic policy shock. Given these computations, the
underlying real values of these magnitudes are calculated which are then introduced as shocks
into the CGE model to get the microeconomic and distributional consequences of the policy
shock.
The problem of the interphase is the absence of an integrating theoretical framework
which explains it. As a result, there are many alternative ways of closing the CGE model any
one of which h_ varying impacts on the microeconomic agents of the economy. T h e
theoretical difficulty is the identification of the appropriate auxiliary variable which is needed
as we add one more general equilibrium condition ••into'the CGE model. There can be several
alternative auxiliary variables for a given macroeconomic constraint which must be _tisfied in
equilibrium. To address this problem about auxiliary variable the modeler must choose what
he thinks to be the most appropriate for the Philippine economy. Thus, the lack of an.
integrating theoretical framework goes down into the what at the moment is a root problem in
economic theory: the micro and macro sides of economic theory remains to be separate
theoretical fields in economics.
/
D. INDUSTRIAL INFORMAL SECTOR
1. F..rameworkand Transmis_on Mechanisms
Awareness of the existence of a large informal Sector was heightened during the worst
aalance of payments crisis experienced by the Philippines in 1983-1985. During this period, a
lot of firms closed shop. Faced with no other alternatives, many laid off workers sought refuge
in the informal sector. Some of those who remained with the formal sector, but experienced a
sharp cut in their real income due to very high inflation rates also joined the in,formal sector to
augment their primary income.
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There is no precise information on the size of the informal sector. Available information
using "residual method" suggests that the informal sector accounted for 73 percent of
nonagricultural employment in 1983 and 37 percent of the total value-added in nonagriculture. 2
Considering the fact that the economic crisis deepened after 1983, the size of the informal sector
could have further expanded.
There is, of course, another wayof defining the informal sector. That is, it consists of
individuals and enterprises operating totally or partially outside the legal system (d_ Soto 1989).
Defined this way, one cannot measure the size of the informal sector from available statistics.
There are, however, small Surveys that tried to describe the characteristics of those belonging
to the informal sector in this sense. For instance, Alonzo and Abrera-Mangahas (1990) found
that most of the enterprises operate as single proprietorships; none are incorporated, and
partnerships are few; family orientation is pervasive; 90 percent of these partnerships are among
family members, while 10 percent are among friends; most enterprises are housed in the
residetace of the owner or owners; fewer than 25 percent have their own shops devoted
exclusively to the business (also cited in Alonzo 1991). These seem to be the same
characteristics as what the government officially defined as micro, cottage andsmall industries.
Many authors have therefore referred to these enterprises as informal (e.g., Quesada and Vicente
1990).
Given these characteristics, the informal sector may be viewed as a household-firm. The
framework outlined in Figure 1 already takes into account the impact of adjustment policies on
the 2nformal sector through three transmission channels, namely the factor markets, output
markets and the provision of public goods. What needs to be elaborated on is the mechanics by
which adjustment policies affect the informal sector. Apart from the three transmission
mechanisms mentioned in Section III, the regulatory environment is a significant factor affecting
the informal factor. The general frame of reference we take of the informal sector is
eloquently expressed in Alonzo (1991):
"The informal sector participant, as the evidence will show, behaves like any other
rational economic agent, responding to the environment he faces, weighing the costs and
benefits of his position, and deciding what is best for him. The economic environment
in many developing countries, however, is conditioned by a host of government
regulations and other external factors that make informality the better option for an
individual who lacks the resources to overcome those barriers. Reforms that would allow
him to afford to become formal would improve not only his situation but also the overall
efficiency of the economy" (p. 41).
Impacts through the Factor Markets
The informal sector typically does not have access to the formal capital markets. Thus,
start-up capital mostly come from their savings, augmented by borrowing from the informal
2This information was taken from Arboleda (1989) who used the "residual method" which simply deducts estimates
of employment in large enterprises from the estimate of the employed labor force from household survey.
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credit markets. For business expansion, they their profits, also augmented by borrowing from
the informal credit markets. The informal credit markets, therefore, are an important source
of capital for the informal sector.
Adjustment policies that involve liberalization of interest rates .and restraint on demand
for credit naturally lead to a rise:in interest rates, especially if the interesf rates in the formal
sector were kept substantially below the market rates before the liberalization. The impact of
adjustment policieson the informal sector in this area depends upon the relationship between the
formal and informal capital markets, A rise in the deposit rates in the formal sector might draw
funds away from the informal capital markets (substitution issue) Withoufnecessatily raising
overall savings (additi0nality issue). Thus, the informal sector will experience a credit crunch
while the formal sector will be facing ample supply of funds. This phenomenon was detected
in Korea (Wijnberger 1983).
It is also possible that credit a crunch in the informal sector brought about by the
adjustment measures ration out:a significant number of firms belonging ito the formal sector.
Convinced of the viability of their-business even in the face of a severe credit crunch, •those
rationed out in the formal Sector may seek funding from the informal credit markets, thereby
crowding out the informal sector.
It seems that the only case in which aojustment ponc_es nave no elreet on me lmormal
sector is when the formal and informal credit markets are completely segmented. This certainly
is far from retdity.
Existing literature on the credit markets have not dealt With these issues. So far,
available evidence shows that in times of economic crisis, more peopl eborrow from the informal
credit markets (Bautista and Magno 1990). However, it is not clear Whether crowding out really
occurred.
In the labor markets, adjustnierit measures have two distinct impacts on the informal
sector. First, in the short-run, laid off Workers from the formal sector may join the ranks of
hired workers in t/le informal seetori Aside from the benefits deri,_;edfr6m the,increased pool
of workers, the informal sector may also benefit from' the skills and technology that these
workers may,bring to the informal sector, thereby i_creasing its Pr0ductivity. 'This may the
lasting effect on the informal sector, since in the medium-run when the economy isplaced in a
sustainable growth path, most of those'workers are expected to go back to the formal sector.
Second, laid off workers from the formal sector may join the ranks of entrepreneurs in
the formal sector. They may intensify competition •if•they gO into areas where the informal
sector is already operating. They may also broaden the activities of the informal sector if they
go into entirely new areas. Whe_er •they leave or stay iit"this sector Oncethe'economy resumes
its growth would depend on the, relative returns• of alternative economic opportunities facing
them.
Existing literature does •notprovideus •with a cleat idea of how adjustment policies affect:
the informal_sector through the labor markets. :,
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Impacts through the Product Markets
The impact of adjustment policies on the •informal sector through the output market is a
:bit more complicated. One can build an extreme ease in which the formal and informal sectors
are producing entirely different products and that adjustment policies affect similarly or
differently those products. However, this is far from reality judging from the activities engaged
in by the informal sector. That is, it engages in economic activities similar those engaged in by
the formal sector, albeit in different scale and technology. Thus, adjustment policies affecting
the outputs of the formal sector similarly affect the outputs of the informal sector. It seems
important then to determine the industry concentration of the informal sector because adjustment
policies have differential impact on the various industries. If for instance, adjustment policies
favor the tradable sector, where the informal sector concentrate, over the non-tradable sector,
then the informal sector will be benefitted. The opposite holds true if the informal sector
concentrate in the non-tradable sector.
Given the lack of capital of the informal sector and access to facilities to enforce
contracts, one might hasten to point out that the informal sector might have concentrated in the
non-tradable sector. The subcontracting arrangement prevalent in Cebu and in other parts of the
country contradicts this view since most of these occur in tradable sectors. In fact, most
subcontractors also enter into arrangements with •their contractors (who are direct exporters) for
their credit, raw materials, and skills training needs to overcome their deficiencies in these areas.
In areas where there is product complementarity between formal and informal sectors as
in the case of subcontracting, the issue might arise with regard to how income is distributed.
Asymmetry in information may cause an unfair distribution of income to the disadvantage of
those who do not possess adequate information about the market like the subcontractors, For
instance, in Cebu where the export manufacturing has been growing significantly and steadily
and there are a good number of progressive large, small and medium and informal enterprises
that interact among one another in various areas including subcontracting, income distribution
measured in terms of the Gini coefficient had worsened between 1985 and 1988, whereas less
progressive areas such as Davao and Iloilo had improved in tandem with the growth of their
• .\
economies. Being among those occupying the lowest rung in the income •ladder, the informal
sector in Cebu might not have benefitted from the export boom. It suggests that adjustment
policies favorably affecting sectors where the informal sector concentrates may not necessarily
lead to improvement in their income. This issue deserves closer examination-_ince available
evidence is still inadequate to give a definitive conclusion.
Impacts through the Provision of Public Goods and Services
The, provision of public goods and services such as roads, clean air, h_!th services, etc.,
may benefit more the informal sector than the formal sector since they ,do not pay for them in
terms of direct taxes (the case of free rider problem). But withdrawal of these goods and
services will hurt equally the formal and informal sector. There are other publicly provided
goods and services that can be accessed only by the formal sector. For example, market
information, skills training programs, and special credit programs may be made available only
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t.oregisteredfirms: _,Obviously;,withdrawalof these duringthe adjustmentprocess wili not hurt
the,informal sector.
It has become a conventionalview, however, that the informalsectordesvrves a special
attentionby the government especially since their ranks would swell during the adjustment
process and_mber worsen itheireconomiccondition. Thus, the nsafetynet"compone_ of the
stabilization programincludes as priority target groupsthe _-informalsector. Others rej_t _is
view because accordingly the informal sector is not necessarily poor in physical and human
capital, nor incapableof coping a hostile environment,and therefore should not be singled out
as recipient of strong affirmative action programs(Alonzo 1991). What may be needed is a
change in regulatory environment (a topic discussed below). This issue deserves further
examination.
•Regulatory Environment
It has .beenpointed out that,many,have remained in the inform_ sector because of the
very high financialbarriersand transactioncoStSinvolved in becomin_ formalor in complying
with all the requiredregulations. Zamora (1991) pointed out that thete'are at least175 non,
labor laws and regulations affecting small and medium enterprises, and setting up a small
•business operation and having it registered involves a long list of steps_andrequirementsthat
may take a numberof months to complete. To register a "jeepney" (which is a public utility
vehicle), a total of 21 documentswere requiredto be attached'to the application form. The
reform in 1990 reduced the number'.of documentsto 5.
There are opportunitycosts of informality. For i_stance, an informalenterprisecannot
avail of the fiscal incentives given to BOI-registered firms. These incentives could raise the
internalrate of returnof a firm by about 3 to 17 percentage points depeading on whether it is
an export- or nonexpOrt-orientedfirm (Manasan1989).
The discussion above suggests that the natureof regulatory environmentcould weaken
or underminethe effectiveness of the adjustmentpolicies by reducing the incentives they offer
to enterprises..
2. MajorResearch Issues/Hypotheses
Despite the plethoraof studies on the informal sector, the impact ofadjustment policies
on this sector throughthe various transmissionchannelsand mechanisms has not beenclosely
examined. Future research should therefore focus on.the following issues/hypotheses:
Factor Markets. The issue is whether reformsdesigned to improve the efficiency of the
formal capital and,money markets and the stabilizati6n measured adopted thatproduced a
temporarycredit crunch have•affected the supplyof credit to the informal sector, hi the factor
markets, the benefits (i.e., inc_ pool of skilled labor) the informalsector enjoy duringthe
adjustmentprocess need to be empiricallyverified.
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Product Markets. It would be worthwhile to examine the industry concentration of the
informal sector and how adjustment policies affect the industry. In cases wher_ein there is
complementarity between the formal and informal credit markets, income distribution becomes
an important issue.
Regulatory Environment. The issue here is whether changes in regulatory environment
would improve the incentive structure of informal enterprises to go formal.
3. Indicators
The issues discussed above suggest the following indicators that must be monitored to
determine the impacts of macroeconomic adjustment policies on the informal sector:
Regulatory Environment. This includes all cost-increasing regulations and their changes
over time. The costs (explicit and implicit) of complying with regulations need to be regularly
monitored. Many of these are now within the responsibility of' local governments. More
aggressive local government executives might relax or reduce those regulations to attract more
investments in their communities.
Factor Markets. With respect to capital markets, the indicators here would include
access of both formal and informal enterprises to formal and informal to these markets.
Changes in the supply of funds in the formal and informal credit markets as well as the extent
of their linkages should also be included. Data for the formal sector are readily available from
published statistics while data for the informal sector have to be gathered through a regular small
sample survey.
With respect to the labor markets, the specific indicators should include the following:
number and characteristics of hired labor; productivity and type of technology used by informal
enterpriseS; degree of competition in the inform_tl sector; and types of activities engaged in by
new entrants to the informal sector. All these have to be gathered from a regular small sample
survey.
Product Markets. The indicators here should include: industry concentration of the
informal sector; linkage with the formal sector (product complementarity or subcontracting);
income of informal enterprises.
E. GENDER ISSUES
i. Framework and Transmission Mechan.ism.8
Gender-differentiated effects arising from macroeconomic adjustment programs are
introduced at two points in the transmission path. First, it affects the operation of the labor
market, the goods market and the distribution of public goods. In terms of Figure 1 it has the
same category as institutional factors which modifies the operation of these markets'. Second,
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it also affects intrahousehold allocation of resources. On both counts, the role is not of a
causative or intermediaby variable but more of a social milieu within which macroeconomic
adjustment programs must operate.
The gender differentiated effects of macroeconomic adjustment policies working through
the various transmission mechanisms in. the labor market, the goods market and public goods
market arise from several factors that are not generated by the adjustment policies themselves
but are products of-culture manifested in preferences or age-old practices. The factors include:
(1) the multiple roles of women only one of which (the productive activitios) is generally
recognized as work (Moser 1987); (2) the concentration of women in few (traditionalwomen)
activities; (3) the limited mobility of_womenbetween economic activities; and (4) the differences
in preferences of males and females, particularly in consumption (Appleton 1991). Adjustment
measures, therefore, should not be expected to eliminate these factors. However, adjustment
programs that ignores these factors may exacerbate gender differentials thereby undermining the
long-term viability and effectiveness of macroeconomic adjustment programs.
Impacts Through the Labor Market
The peculiarities of the labor market determines the gender-differentiated effects of
adjustment policies. In particular, the concentration of women in few sectors and wage
differentials for the same qualification, for whatever reasons, will engender impacts of
adjustment policies. In the Philippines, women who manage ,to get employed face several
problems, including lower pay relative to male workers in similar job, lower positions occupied
by women, and adverse policies in promotion and training. Moreover, unlike men who lost their
jobs through poor performance, women, as a group, tend to be laid off or terminated for
economic reasons, such as partial shutdown or retrenchment of factories or companies (Licuanan
1991).
When adjustmentprograms promote sectors that employ predominantly women, relative
wages and income will improve.in favor of women. Butwhen these mean leaving the house to
work in a factory, this will come in conflict with the home role of women. Heace, they may
decide against (or will be 'culturally' constrained from) taking advantage of this favorable
development. On the other hand, informal sectors are women-dominated since, among others,
it offers flexibility which reduces role conflicts, The extent with which structural adjustment
promotes informal Sectors as integral parts of the economic system,:det_nfi'nes the extent of
benefits Womenderive from structural:adjustment.
Impacts Through the Product Markets
When structural adjustment mean changes in relativeprices, gender-differentiated effects
arise from gender-concentration in few economic sectors. As a well-known trade theory states,
increases in the relative output price varies proportionately with returns of the input used more
intensively in the production of the output whose price has increased _(Appleton1991).- For
example, in the Philippines exportable sectors like garments, electronics and handicrafts employ
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predominantly women. Adjustment policies that tend to promote these export products will
benefit women more than men.
Impacts through the Provision of Public Goods
When macroeconomic stabilization programs mean less social services, women are
affected on two counts. First, since social services are women-dominated occupations,
proportionately less of them will be hired (or more of them will be fired). Second, given the
traditional role of women as a source of health care, as preparers of food, and as auxiliary
teachers in the home, less social services mean additional effort for women to make up for lost
services previously provided more amply. Since these activities are rarely regarded as work,
they would not figure prominently in household decisions.
Gender In lntrahousehold Resource and Work Allocation
In the Philippines, gender differentiated claims to resources have been demonstrated in
the matter of food, personal needs (clothes, slippers, powder), and leisure goods or activities
(Illo 1988, Illo and Uy 1992).
A survey on the three provinces of Abra, Antique, and South Cotabato depicts that the
structure of household expenditure reflects the preferences of the contributors to the household
income (Garcia 1991).
It is argued that male and female have different preferences over expenditures. In
particular, females are known to give priority to children's goods more than men (Appleton
1991). Furthermore, the preference that gets reflected in household expendit0res is largely
dependent on who contributes to household irtcome (e.g. Garcia 1991). Hence, structural
adjustment that have gender-specific income effects, either through prices of goods women
produce or higher wages for women workers, will have implications on the allocation of
household expenditure. This also implies that women-headed households will generate
significantly different structure of household expenditures than male-headed households.
Changes in real income could affect households and their individual members differently
depending on how households cope with this market outcome. The immediate implication is a
reduction of available cash for food. This could mean more work for women: in the rural
areas, growingmore subsistence food crops and/or foraging for food; in the urban areas,
processing food. In addition, on the basis of ideas of entitlement to food and other basic goods,
women (including pregnant and lactating women) have to make do with less or without while
their spouses and children are given first option to what food is available (Illo 1992).
2. Major Issues
There is virtually no study on gender-differentiated effects arising from past adjustment
programs undertaken by the Philippines. The importance to policymakers of knowing these
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issues with empirical analysis cannot be understated. For future studies the major issues that
must be empirically verified are as follows:
GenderConcentration and Mobility between Economic Activities. Women are
concentratedinfeweconomicactivitieswhicharetraditionallyconsideredtobewomen jobs.
Thus,structuraladjustmentprogramsthatpromoteindustriesthatareconsideredwomen-
dominatedwillfavorwomen morethanmen. For example,inthePhilippinesexportable
productsuchas garments,electronicsand handicraftsareconsideredwomen-dominated
industries,adevaluationthereforeshouldbenefitwomen intermsofrisingwagesandincomes.
However,when theirmobilityislimitedbecauseofeitheroleconflictsorinadequateprior
training,benefitsderivedwouldbeseverelyimited.
Multiple roles, intrahousehold resource and work allocation, and household coping
mechanisms to changes in prices and incomes. Women are known to have multiple roles one
only of which, 'productive' activities, is regarded as 'work'. When households cope with
declining incomes, due to either lay off or rising prices, this usually mean women doing
'productive' activities over and above their other roles. This means not only physical but also
psychological and emotional stress. In addition, the allocation of the decreasing supply of goods
and resources exacerbate whatever gender-based ideas:of entitlement prevail within the
household.
Cutback in social services expenditures. Food preparation, care for the sick and being
auxiliary teachers in the home are traditionally taken to be roles for women. Thus, reductions
in government expenditures that reduCeSthe share of sOelalServiceswiliaffeet women more than
men. In addition, if stabilization programs requires laying off social services sector workers this
is virtually synonymous to laying off women workers sinceworkers in,the social services sectors
are predominantly women.
3. Indicators
Some of, the relevant indicators _are already gender-differentiated and readily available
from current monitoring systems. These indicators and the surveys/Censuses that generae,them
include:
Population Censuses:
urban:rural distribution
educational attainment
Labor Force ,Surveys:
labor foreepartieipation
employment
occupational classification
seetoml classification
Nutrition Surveys:
nutrient intake
nutritional status
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Health Surveys:
morbidity rate
mortality rate
Some other indicators, however, has to be generated by specialized surveys. These will
include:
- changes in intrahousehold consumption patterns
- changes in intrahousehold emPloyment patterns
- changes in intrahousehold impact of changes in sectoral spending in health and
education
- changes inthe balance between women's time in their productive, reproductive,
and community managing roles
- gender-differentiated claims to resources (food; personal needs - clothes,
slippers,powder), and leisure goods or activities (drinking, smoking, gambling).
- relative resource status
- relative workloads
relative wage rates
relative positions in the employment structure
proportion of women-headed households
F. IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS ON HOUSEHOLDS AND FIRMS
1. Framework and Transmissio.n Mechanisms
Government Intervention and the Objective of Regulation
Government intervention in the economy takes many forms as public policy seeks to
correct distortions and market failure which bring about misallocation of resources. Such
. failures are often manifested through excessive profits, quality decline in goods and services and
exploitation of labor. According to Stiglitz (1988), there are six circumstances or conditions of
market failures that prevent the market from reaching Pareto efficiency: (1) failure of
competition; (2) public goods; (3) externalities; (4) incomplete markets; (5) information failures
and (6) unemployment, inflation and disequilibrium. One way that government intervenes in the
economy is through regulations. This is justified from the economic standpoint when the social
benefits exceed the costs to the economy. The basic idea here seems to be that the existence of
government reflects more than just the pursuit of political or social agendas but also the
implementation of public policies needed to guide, correct and supplement market
conditions.
Since regulatory administration enforces standards and follows procedures, its shape and
scope are strongly affected by the form and nature of legal systems. The legal and
administrative systems, e;g. the civil service affect the form of the regulatory agency, its manner
of operation and its relationship to the rest of the government.
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Adjustment Policies, Regulations, Households and Firms
Regulation has been defined as "the intentional restriction of choice by a party not
directly involved in or performing, the regulated activity" (Mitnick 1980). More specifically,
it involves activities which (a) affect the operating business environment of private enterprise
including market entry and exit, rate; price and profit structures, and competition; (b) control
specific services or products through permit, certification or licensing requirements as provided
by law or policy, and (c) relate to the development, administration and enforcement of national
standards normally by a designated public agency.
Control can be formally imposed through a defined scope of functions and authorities.
Proper authority is often prescribed and conveyed through (a) corporate charters; (b) a franchise
which often is legislated and with a timeframe; (c) the grant of certificate, permit or license; and
(d) a certificate of public convenience and necessity as in the case of transport utilities.
Firms and households engaged in production for the market who are mostly found in the
informal sector are affected by government regulations especially those which regulate
productive activities. Rules, laws and regulations define the boundaries of their productive
endeavors. These have to do with (a) entry and ownership conditions; (b) access to inputs and
fiscal treatment of the given business activity; (e) input pricing and costs; (d) public safety; (f)
exit conditions; (g) and other regulations. These regulations seem to drive a wedge between
what economic agents can earn in a regime of minimal or no regulations and what they in fact
earn under a heavily regulated environment. In a certain sense "there is a differential between
the profit that can be achieved by the unregulated firm and the profit that is permitted under
regulation" (Bailey ).
An interesting point here is the interaction between the adjustment program and the
presence of regulations. As explained in Section III of this paper, the implementation of
adjustment policies may change the composition ot_output of the economy and may result into
the shift of employment towards the expanding sectors. The structure of incentives may favor
the production of more tradable goods relative to non-tradables, Some sectors of the economy
like power, transportation and communications belong to the non-tradable sector of the economy.
Regulations and other government restrictions on the non-tradable sector will result to
inefficiency and unreliability of supply of non-tradable goods. If these goods are inputs to the
tradable sector say, power as an input to garment exports, then the high costs of inputs sourced
from the non-tradable sector will have an adverse impact on the competitiveness of the export
sector and the economy in general. Households and firms that are engaged in the production
of tradables will therefore be adversely affected and the entire economy as well as the strict
regulatory environment acts like a millstone on the economy.
What this implies is that regulations impose costs of compliance and transaction both to
households and firms. In fact, there is a growing research on the costs of formality (de Soto
1989) which essentially show that unnecessary and burdensome government regulations only
motivate businesses to stay underground with corresponding costs on the economy's ability to
expand output and employment by taking advantage of the economies of scale and scope. There
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is, therefore, an ample basis for consistency between a growth-oriented adjustment program and
regulatory environment that is conducive to production and employment generation.
An important area of concern is the role and character of regulatory institutions in the
economy. It is critical to have institutions which can act flexibly in the face of a liberalizing and
deregulating environment. There must be consistency between the liberal atmosphere of the
adjustment policies and the regulations that embody these policies. There must also be a
corresponding liberalization or change in the mindsets and behavior of institutions which
implement regulations. But because bureaucrats and politicians suffer from the inertia of
discretionary power, there may be reluctance on their part to push for a more relaxed regulatory
environment following the adoption of an adjustment program. It is not enough to have a sound
adjustment and regulatory framework; it is imperative that implementors will be more than
willing to have a smaller role for government in the market economy.
2. Recent Trends in Der.egulation
The Philippines has pursued the market-orientation of economic policies and consequently
has deregulated to some extent a number of sectors, namely, agriculture, financial sector,
transportation, telecommunications and the power sector. This section mentions briefly the
deregulation attempts in those sectors and then, focuses on the power sector which was chosen
by the MIMAP Project as a case in point to illustrate the impacts of regulations on households
and firms.
The deregulation in agriculture since the early 1980s phased out price and quantitative
controls, levies and certain taxes and the elimination of barriers to entry. In the financial sector,
the 1980 reforms sought to foster competitive conditions in the financial markets and improve
the availability of medium-and long-term funds to the industrial sector. They included reforms
on pricing policies for the various financial assets as well as on the structure of the financial
system, such as more liberal bank entry and branching policy and a clearer role for governn_ent
financial institutions in the financial system, among others. In transportation, some of the
deregulation policies introduced are (1) the one-airline policy for international and domestic
operation ; (2) the upgrading of existing bus fleets; (3) the demonopolization of cargo handling
services in the government ports; (4) the privatization of Philippine Airlines and (5) the full
or partial decontrol of transport fare rates. On the other hand, in telecommunications, the
gradual reduction of barriers to entry and price control and the devolution of regulatory powers
to regional offices and local governments units (LGUs) are being pursued by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
The MIMAP Project chose the power sector as a component of the project for a number
of reasons. First, the power sector plays a key role in the economy. The availability of power
bears upon the viability and competitiveness of the entire economy, especially of those sectors
which are quite vulnerable to the absence or erratic availability of power, such as the export-
oriented garments and electronics industries. This fact has been amply demonstrated in the
recent experience with power outages which cost untold millions of pesos in opportunitY losses.
Given an estimated elasticity of power demand relative to GNP of 1.2 to 1.5, energy supply has
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failed to keep up with the average annual economic growth of 4.5 percent in 1986-90. The
consequences are economically costly outages.
Second, power is a vital non-tradable good. Its availability and price influence the
competitiveness not only of the entire economy, but especially of power-dependent tradable
goods. In an open economy situation an adjustment program intends to liberalize markets
towards producing for world consumption. To achieve thisgoal, policymakers have to reckon
with regulations which limit not only the competitiveness but also raise the costs of producing
tradable goods. In the case of the power sector regulations result into inefficiency and
unreliability of supply of power, a non-tradable good which is an input into the tradable sector.
Third, there are vital backward linkages of the power sector with other sectors that
policymakers have to consider, For example, the exploitation of some indigenous energy
sources has major economic and social implications especially on the type of affected
communities, households, occupational groups and labor skills involved. Hydro, geothermal and
dendro sources of energy are usually located in natural habitats where upland dwellers, cultural
communities and other socio-economic groups are dependent on natural resources for their
livelihood and sustenance and are vulnerable to adjustment policies.
3. Impacts on Households and Firms and Some H__vpo_e_ses
An intricate web of government regulationsand a complex institutional structu_re oversee
the power sector. The power sector has two major components: (a) electric power generation
(EPG) and (b) electric power distribution (EPD). Power generation is affected by both the
external (world) environment and internal policies, regulations and institutions which determine
the available supply and prices of imported and local energy inputs, principally oil and coal.
The exchange rate, the level and structure of tariffs and the allocation of the government budget
have major implications on the cost of fuel and other inputs in'the EPG sector. Regulation of
the EPG sector cover four broad areas, namely: '(a) entry; (b) pricing; (c) operations and (d)
exit. On the other hand, EPD has to do with the institutional arrangements for service coverage,
mode of distribution and pricing. Electricity is distributed either by public or private utilities
or both with specific service areas defined by their respective franchises and operating permits.
Non-market regulations covering EPG and EPD involve public safety, environmental
integrity and interconnection facilities. Various regulatory bodies implement these regulations.
For instance, clearance and permit covering location and the environment are required by these
bodies prior to an energy project implementation. These have implications on the quality of
service and return on investments through the costs of the design, teehnieal compatibility of
projects and revenue sharing arrangements with existing operating systems. The ability of
regulatory bodies to assess the technical, environmental, economic and social costs and benefits
of the proposed projects will be critical in the grant of operating permits and effective
monitoring of performance.
The first set of regulations affecting the sector follows the Constitutional requirement to
limit the exploitation and development of the natural resources to three modalities: (1) co-
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production; (2) production sharing and (3) joint venture. This is a new approach which will
allow the government to improve its share of the returns from the exploitation of natural
resources in contrast to the concession approach authorized before. Some ownership restrictions
exist, like nationality requirements in the case of foreigners.
The second consists of entry conditions in power generation. Before the National Power
Corporation had the monopoly on power generation and distribution. This has been lifted by
Executive Order 215 although it allows conditioned entry, due to a number of requirements that
have to be satisfied by new entrants. In addition to this, the government has also allowed the
lease and sale of government assets to the private sector.
Third, participants in power generation, distribution and related activities have to comply
with laws on franchise. The improvement here was that the grant by RA 6957 of the utility
franchise to the lowest bidder by the concerned infrastructure agency or the local government
unit having jurisdiction on the project.
Fourth, in the case of inputs the ability of EPGD operators to provide viable service is
influenced by some administrative restrictions like clearance from the Energy Regulatory Board
for (1) coal importation to encourage the use of local resources; (2) the importation of refined
petroleum products and electric generator sets used by entities other than public utilities.
Fifth, an important concern is the provision of the new Local Government Code on the
sharing of the national wealth and the imposition of franchise taxes. Local government units and
affected communities may become more receptive to EPGD projects due to the sharing of
royalties and other income from the utilization of natural resources.
In sum there have been various attempts to deregulate entry, ownership and operations
regulations/conditions in the EPGD. However, the pricing aspects of the sector is still very
much subject to regulations. This is inconsistent with the adjustment program and the
deregulation trends in the economy and clearly impacts adversely first, on the efficiency of the
EPGD and secondly, on households and firms as explained in our framework. In addition,
access and equity issues need to address the conflict between cost recovery and the need to assist
the vulnerable groups to cope up with or adjust to the new economic framework.
Households and firms are directly affected by energy source development, electric power
generation and distribution through (1) the nature, source and relative prices of fuel that they
consume; (2) the demand of power-dependent firms for labor; (3) the availability of public goods
and services which are produced by the state which is also a power consumer. The impact on
households is conditioned by their observed response to electric power rates as measured by
elasticities of demand relative to price and income and the cross elasticity of fuel substitution
such as from electricity to fuelwood. The income elasticity of household energy demand is
generally less than unity. It is higher for low-income groups and therefore energy prices have
a very significant distributive effect. This often leads to differential pricing of energy products
with bias in favor of fuel products like kerosene and electricity used mainly by poor households.
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The demand of firms for labor depends on both the direct and indirect effects of changes
in the price of energy on such firms. This will in turn depend on the energy-intensity of firms,
inter-fuel substitution and the substitutability between energy and other factors of production.
Based on OECD studies the elasticity of substitution between labor and energy ranges from 0.6
to 2.2 depending on the degree of aggregation, the estimation period and the estimation
procedure. On inter-fuel substitution, the values of cross-price elasticities are generally lower
at the household level than at the firm level due to the high capital costs of shifting that is
induced by changing relative prices.
The decision to have a lesser government presence in the economy augurs well for its
future growth. An adjustment program to be successful must also have as a component the
review and rationalization of the economy's regulatory framework. That regulations have a
pervasive effect on households and firms can not be overemphasized. Moreover, the
government cannot pretend to have the resources to finance and promote development; it must,
therefore, give the private sector an enlarged role in the economy.
It is mainly in this context and alongside the need to pursue an adjustment'program that
is sensitive to its impact on households and firms, especially the vulnerable groups that the
regulatory aspects of economic p0licymaking must undergo review. If privatization is to be
encouraged, the stifling hold of heavy market regulation must be relaxed. Instead, government
may have to concentrate on nonmarket- related regulations, e.g., to improve public safety, to
ensure compliance with performance standards where monopoly privileges to operate are
conferred, and to protect the natural environment.
The review of regulations must address legal and other government regulations/
restrictions and institutions which create disincentives to private enterprise and make the cost of
becoming formal, aboveground enterprises too high for informal enterprises. Deregulation must
be comprehensively pursued across all sectors and accompanied by other modes of liberalization,
such as decentralization, if the ultimate objective of freeing private initiatives and efficient
resource allocation are to be achieved. The systematic review and reform of the regulatory
framework across and within sectors can yield efficiency gains.
The Philippine experience in the 1980s and 1990sshows a mixed trend of more and less
regulations. There are less regulations now in the fields of industry, agriculture, finance and
utilities. On the other hand, there are more regulations affecting the natural environment.
Similarly, legal and administrative requirements on public consultations, whether oh proposed
policies or investment projects are now iiiaposedand dictated by political realities. 'A wide scope
for further regulatory reforms exist in many sectors.
Households, whether as consumers or providers of labor services, have been affected
differently depending on whieh sector and aspect of t_perations have been delivered from
restrictions. In the case of regulations on public safety and the natural environment, trade-offs
often exist between irrimediate investments and jobs and safer but CoStlierprojects. Conflict
resolution with compensation mechanisms are critical in addressing suchtrade-offs preferably
outside the ambit oLthe judiciary to avoid unnecessary ie)_aleomplicatiorrs.
a .
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V. MONITORING SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The two basic issues in monitoring the household impact of macroeconomic adjustment
policies deal with: (1) the object; and (2) the design of the monitoring system. The object of
the monitoring system is defined in terms of who shall be monitored, what is to be monitored
about them, and how frequent will the reporting be. The design of the monitoring system, on
the other hand, has to deal with: (1) the data generators at the field level; (2) the organizational
structure that will manage the data flow from the field to every geopolitical level for processing
and/or analysis and that will determine the computer hardware and software requirements; and
(3) the relationship of this system with the relevant existing monitoring systems.
The object of a MIMAP monitoring system should be the population groups, firms and
individuals most vulnerable to macroeconomic adjustment programs. It is necessary that the
critical indicators in the whole range of processes and outcomes in the transmission path from
changes in macroeconomic policies to firms, household and individual outcomes shall be
monitored. This is because while monitoring the final impact of macroeconomic adjustment
policies on households and individuals is the ultimate aim, it is also equally important that
intermediate processes and outcomes be monitored in order to know and appreciate the role of
intermediate outcomes along the transmission path on the final impact. In particular, in processes
that determine social sector outcomes, the intervening links spell the difference in appreciating
the final impact on households of changes in market outcomes (Herrin 1992). Furthermore,
while the final household and individual outcomes will determine the effectiveness of the
macroeconomic adjustment programs, the intermediate processes and outcomes will be useful
in evaluating the soundness of the assumptions employed in the design of adjustment policies.
The vulnerable groups are typically small entrepreneurs in the informal sector, small
lowland and upland farmers, small fisberfolk, small scale miners and daily wage workers.
Within households the vulnerable members are children and women.
For individuals and population groups, what needs to be monitored are the ultimate
indicators of welfare and the immediate determinants of welfare. Human welfare can be
measured by various indicators, but survival is the best final indicator of human welfare. The
immediate determinants of survival are nutritional status, morbidity and health status, literacy
and housing condition. These are, in turn, determined by adequate food, adequate and
accessible medical care and other public services, potable water supply and adequate
environmental sanitation, and basic education (Florentino 1992).
The indicators for the transmission mechanisms can be divided into those that operate at
the market level, and those that operate within the household. At the market level, the indicators
shall include relative prices of output, relative returns to inputs, seetoral and geographic
distribution of government expenditures, rate of natural resource depletion, gender composition
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of employment by sector and occupational groups, changes in the directions of investments,
changes in tenure/own_ship of assets, access to both formal and informal capital markets,
indicators on the regulatory environment, productivity and type of technology used by informal
enterprises, degree of competition in the informal sector, industry concentration and linkages
with the format sector. The indicators of the transmission mechanisms within the household
include changes in the household consumption and human capital investment patterns, changes
in the employment patterns of household members, changes in women's time between
productive, reproductive, and community managing roles.
At the macro level, the information required will include macroeconomic policies and
macroeconomic variables. Macroeconomic policies will include monetary, fiscal, exchange rate
and trade policies as well as sectoral policies. Macroeconomic variables will include the general
price level, exchange rate, interest rate, money supply, tariff structure, government
expenditures/revenues/deficits, aggregate demand and output.
The issues and approaches to the design of the monitoring system will be discussed
below. This is because the design wil_ largely depend on the kind of indicators required.
B. INDICATORS
1. Macroeconomi¢ Policies and Variables
1.1 Policies
monetary policies
fiscal policies
exchange rate policies
trade policies
sectoral policies
1.2 MacroeconomicVariables
exchange rate
interest rate
general price level
money supply
governmentexpenditure/revenues/deficit
aggregate demand
output
2. Tran_mis_ig.n.Mechanisms
2.1 Market Level
relative prices of products
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- relative wages
- relative rents for factors
- sectoral allocation of government expenditures
- regional distribution of government infrastructure
- gender composition of employment by sector and occupational groups
- distribution of assets by tenm:e/ownership status
distribution of new business registration and paid-in capital by sector.
cost of major purchased inputs relative to the farm-gate/fishport price of the
product
rate of deforestation
rate of decline in productivity
rate of shifting from one resource type (e.g. public land) to another (i.e.
cropland)
catch per unit effort
rate of use of destructive utilization methods
- rate of effluent discharges
- access to both formal and informal capital markets
- productivity and type of technology used by the informal sector
- industry concentration of informal sector
- linkages of informal sector with formal sector (product complementarity or
subcontracting)
- income of informal enterprises
2.2 Within theHousehold
- proportion of children who are working
- proportion of women's'time in productive, reproductive, and community
managing roles
calorie and energy intake relative to RDA, by sex, by age-group
3. Household/Individual Welfare
Those marked (**) are key indicators and those with (*) are support indicators.
The support indicators come from currently operating monitoring systems of the
statistical system. In parenthesis are individuals / institutions responsible for data
gathering and the data reporting frequency, respectively.
3.1 Survival
Under-five mortality rate, by sex [U5MR] (Communtty Monitor (CM),
Monthly)**
- life expectancy at birth, by sex (NSO, annual.)*
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3.2 Nutritional Status
- prevalence of preschool underweight, by sex [among nutritionally at
risldsocioeconomically disadvantaged households] (BITW/BNS/Midwife,
Annual)**
- prevalence of preschool underweight and wasting, by sex (FNRI,bi-annual)*
3.3 Health Status
- incidence rate of diarrhea among under-five children, by sex (CM/Midwife,
Monthly)**
- Mortality/Morbidity rates of communicable diseases, by sex (DOH, Annual)*
3.4 Housing
percentage of households in makeshift housing made of light materials
(CM/Soeial Worker (SW), Annual)**
- distribution of households by type of materials (NSO, quinquennial)*
3.5 Adequacy of Food
- prope_on of householdstakingone meal or less a day (SW,Monthly)**
- proportion of the population or householdswith energy intake less than 80%
of recommended dietary allowance (RDA) (FNRI,quinquennial)*
- proportion Of Grade VI pupils (households) with less than acceptable diet
score, by sex (Planning and Development Office (PDO), annual)*
3.6 Public Services
-proportion of households with access to sanitary toilet facilities
(CM/BHW/SW, Annual)**
- proportion of households with access to potable water supply
(CM/BI-IW/SW,Annual)**
- ratio of RHU and BHS to population/households(MHO,annual)*
proportion of unemployed/underemployed,who availed ,of skills training, by
sex &DO, annual)*
3.7 Basic Education
elementary schools enrollment rate and dropout rate, by sex (School Principal,
Annual)**
- average educational attainment,by sex (PDO,quinquennial)*
- adultbasic literacy rate, by sex (PDO,quinquennial)*
3.8 Income
- percentageof households with mostbasic possessions [no luxury items] (CM,
Annual)**
- medianfamily income by majoroccupationalgroup of household head (NSO,
Triennial)*
- mean income of families in bottom30% (NSO,Triennial)*
- percentageof householdbelow the poverty line (NSO,triennial)*
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3.9 Employment
- unemployment/underemployment rate, by sex (CM/SW, Monthly)**
- unemploymenffunderemployment rate, by sex (NSO, Quarterly)*
3.10 Prices of Basic Commodities
- cost of 450g of staple as proportion of average daily wage rate (DTI:
Annual)**
- real cost of staple (DTI,quarterly)*
C. APPROACHES AND ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF THE MONITORING SYSTElVl
It is obvious that many of the indicators at the macro level are already regularly
monitored. As we go down the transmission path to the household, however, indicators become
scarce both in required disaggregation of data items and in reporting frequency. A MIMAP
monitoring system should be both regular and more frequent in reporting the required indicators.
One crucial issue in the design of the monitoring system is the extent of participation of
local level data producers. One view is that local processing is necessary so _that remedial
measures can be _ndertaken right away at the field level rather than wait for a national analysis
to come out. Another view is that a centralized processing and analysis is necessary to facilitate
overall analysis and protect the integrity of the data. However, this may not be necessary if the
staff at the local level are properly trained, motivated and appreciative of the efforts.
Another issue is the coverage of the monitoring system. One view is that a statistically
adequate number of randomly selected economically depressed municipalities can serve as index
or sentinel areas for MIMAP monitoring. Another view, of course, is that no less than a national
statistically representative sample is required to be definitive on any statement of the impact of
adjustment programs. The choice will largely depend on which is more important, frequency
and timeliness or coverage and representativeness. Our preference is for the former because of
our desire to provide a quicker feedback mechanism to policy makers.
The proposed use of community volunteer monitors as key informants may nave
overextended the dependence of the system on volunteerism. This fear is based on the
performance of the current administrative reporting systems where even those mandated by law
fall to deliver on their duties (Africa 1992). This point is important in the deciding who shall
be utilized as key field data generators.
There is another issue regarding the monitoring of impacts on individuals within
households as well as those in resource and environment studies. This will undoubtedly require
detailed household surveys which will not only measure indicators with the household as a unit,
but also down to the level of individual members as well as how households interact with his
environment. As such, this will require in-depth household surveys and community monitors
or any rapid assessment systems will be inappropriate for this activity. This is where timeliness
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and frequency may be sacrificed for depth. The studies where this kind of dam are required will
make use of any longitudinal data generated for studies on the dynamics of both intrahousehold
allocation as well as natural resource depletion.
Perhaps the final issue is whether MIMAP monitoring requires an independent
organization to manage the data flow or should it be merely a rider to an existing monitoring
system. At the village level, there are at least two community-based monitoring systems being
developed. One is the one being developed under the DPSS project jointly being undertaken by
the Congressional Planning and Budget Office, the National Statistics Office and the Philippine
Rural Reconstng'tion Movement. Another is the National Statistical Coordinating Board's
Community-based C.hild Monitoring System. The other alternative is the different administrative
reporting systems. Still another alternative is the Integrated Survey of Households which is done
quarterly. The major problem is that the objectives of these systems are different from. those
of MIMAP. This will pose an important obstacle in the desire for MIMAP monitoring to focus
on the population groups, firms, households and individuals most vulnerable to changes
macroeconomic policies.
On the role of existing monitoring systems, it was proposed that since these systems
produced inadequate data in terms of frequency (except for the Integrated Survey of Households
(ISH) which is mainly for monitoring employment) and data items, these shall be utilized as
sources of support indicators to describe the nation as a whole and not only sentinel areas: The
section on the household/individual welfare indicators has shown how currently available
indicators can be used to support primary indicators that will be gathered by a MIMAP
monitoring system. In addition, the current national surveys will also be useful in testing
hypotheses presented above and in producing initial estimates of the needed parameters of a
simulation model that will be useful for counterfactual analyses and evaluation of existing and
proposed adjustment programs. These activities will likely require the merging of different
existing household surveys. Furthermore, it maybe fruitful to utilize the sampling frame that
NSO uses in its household surveys to allow possible"merging with other surveys.
D. THE PROPOSED MONITORING SYSTEM
Let us first define the features of the desired MIMAP monitoring system before
specifying its components. The MIMAP monitoring system should have the following features:
1. It includes indicators that are highly sensitive to changes in macroeconomic
policies and allow hypotheses developed earlier to be tested and simulation
models developed.
2. It makes use of existing data gathering systems and institutions with minimal
additional indicators to be collected regularly as a rider where appropriate. For
other indicators they may be collected for households, firms, and individuals most
vulnerable to adjustment policies.
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3. The data collection and processing system should be decentralized although
analysis can be centralized.
The discussion above conveys that there are existing monitoring systems that gather
relevant indicators needed by MIMAP but these are not done in the required frequency,
particularly at the household level. The only exception, in terms of frequency, is the quarterly
Integrated Survey of Households. In addition, for macroeconomic variables and indicators of
transmission mechanisms at the market levd, these are currently available in the desired
frequency and perhaps also in the desired disaggregation. Then an effective MIMAP monitoring
system should utilize these existing monitoring systems and its organizational structures. This
augurs well with the view that while in the early stages the MIMAP Project Management Office
(PMO may closely supervise the development and installation of the MIMAP monitoring system.
The institutionalization of the system, however, is the long-term objective.
Given the foregoing considerations, the proposed monitoring system will consist of three
major groups of activities. First, is the gathering of secondary indicators on macro policies,
macro variables and transmission mechanisms at the market level. This will be one of the main
activities of research assistants at the PMO. For this set of data the frequency of reporting is
semestral. Second, is the generation of primary data at the household and firm level not
available in the ISH but needed by MIMAP. This will be addressed by rider module(s) to the
ISH. What data items to include in the rider module(s) will be determined by the data
requirements of two major activities in Phase iii. These are: (i) the testing of hypotheses
presented above; and (ii) the development of a simulation model that will be used for
counterfactual exercises. The rider(s), however, will only be implemented in subject areas of
the studies; i.e. depressed villages for studies on the poor households; coastal, upland, and
mining villages for resource and environment studies; city sub-sections for industrial informal
sector studies. Again the proposed frequency is semestral to coincide with the reporting
frequency of the first data set. A quarterly reporting system may be too frequent for thorough
analyses of the data generated. Third, is the generation of primary data on intrahousehold
allocations and for resource and environment studies. Due to the implied detail of this data set
and the premium for frequency in the analyses of the impact of macroeconomic policies up to
the household level, intrahousehold allocation issues and resource and environment issues will
have to be addressed in different and less frequent surveys. The proposed frequency is annual.
The linking key to the other two data sets is that respondent households in these surveys will be
taken from the sample in the second data set. Efforts will be exerted to make this data set
longitudinal so as to address dynamic issues in intrahousehold aUocation and resource depletion.
This data set will be gathered with the assistance of NGOs operating in subject areas. This
strategy will entail training of village level data, generators in the collection and processing of
data. All data sets will be maintained at the PMO for analysis and reporting purposes.
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ANNEX
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS
1. MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS - Dr. Benjamin Diokno, UPSE
This paper will identify the scale and evolution of those macro imbalances and discuss
the various courses of action that might allow the country to deal with these imbalances. In so
doing, this paper will provide a framework that sets out the constraints within which policy
choice_ in specific sectors have to be made. At the same time, the significance of the various
developments that will be identified at the micro level can only be assessed in relation to their
effect on easing or tightening this initial set of constraints. One key question to ask is: "What
outcomes at the micro level would have to occur if the existing macro adjustment policies are
to succeed in easing rather than worsening the initial imbalances?" This paper should address
policies and transmission mechanisms in a broad and general level. The results here can serve
as inputs in other component areas in this Project. It might also be worthwhile here to explore
the role of various quantitative models,such as the CGE model, in performing macroeconomic
policy analysis.
2. MONITORING - Dr. Rodolfo Florentine, FNRI
This paper will focus primarily on a more precise and reliable identification of the most
vulnerable groups to policy changes, irrespective of whether they belong to the formal and
informal sectors or whether these are defined regionally, sectorally, occupationally and/or,by
age, by gender, by ethnicity or by some other factor. One of the first tasks is to provide a
summary of existing data regarding changes in soeial and in welfare conditions over the past few
years. Section VI of the general framework paper by Lamberte et al. provides a good starting
point. It is hoped that this paper will generate best estimates of recent welfare trends based on
all presently available information and to identify those additional bits of information that could
most effectively test the validity of those estimates. The ultimate aim of this paper is to
design a reliable monitoring system that can quickly produce information on micro impacts of
macroeconomie adjustment policies on a timely and regular basis. ,
3. AGRICULTURAL sECTOR - Dr. RamonClarete, UPSE ' :'
This paper will focus on,:the:Changes that have been occurring .in the level and the
patterns of production and labor use in the agricultural sector. It should ask whether the sector
is moving towards a more viable and sustainable pattern of growth that could eventually help
to ease simultaneously the foreign exchange problem, the food price and food availability
problem, the urbanization/rural labor absorption problem and the income distribution/poverty
problem.
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4. NATURAL RF__OURCE AND ENVIRONMENT SECTOR - Dr. Herminia Francisco,
UPLB
The paper might, begin by summarizing the evidence regarding the extent of the
degradation that has already occurred in various areas, i.e., forestry, coastal fishing, etc., and
attempt some estimates of the point at which these problems might begin to have a discontinuous
impact on output and productivity, on welfare and health and/or on the quality of life more
generally defined. The works of Dr. Marian de los Angeles of PIDS on these issues would be
a good.source of information. Where necessaryand feasible, the paper should define research
activities that could enhance the ability to make such judgments about the future. The paper
should also be able to establish linkage between the level and pattern of agricultural production
and the environment.
5. INDUSTRIAL AND INFORMAL SECTORS - Dr. Ramon Quesada, CRC
This paper needs to focus on two central issues. First, to what extent is it possible to
see the growth of informal activities that has occurred in the context of recent adjustment
policies as a positive change, likely to enhance and accelerate the long term process of
accumulation and growth in the economy; and to what extent is this phenomenon more likely
to reflect a process of economic decline and prospects. Second, to what extent is there evidence
to indicate that current policies are leading to the emergence of a successful competitive
industrial base that has the capacity to expand manufacturing exports in the longer term, that is
likely to repatriate a significant proportion of its future earnings and profits for reinvestment in
the Philippines; and that is also prepared to contribute through taxes to the financing of the
educational and infrastructure base that will determine the future attractiveness Of Philippines to
all investors.
6. SOCIAL SERVICES SECTORS - Dr. Alejandro Hen-in, UPSE
This paper might begin by summarizing the evidence regarding trends in both the quantity
and quality of social services being received in recent years in the Philippines. It will then seek
to identify the distributional impact of these trends; consider their efficiency implications; and
attempt to make estimates of the degree to. which one could realistically expect to resolve this
impending problem through inereasing efficiency ;in the use of resources devoted to social
services. This paper should be closely linked with the paper on monitoring system since the
latter will be focusing on a nanfow set of social indicators. While the latter focuses on empirical
indicators important to various steps of analysis, tlaeformer, on the other hand, will try to relate
those various indicators.among themselves ,andwith other indicators as the testable:hypotheses
suggest.
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7. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS - Dr. Wilfredo G. Nuqui, UNICEF
The main issue here would appear to be the feasibility or desirability of attempting to
regulate various activities either through market mechanisms or through more direct
administrative forms of control. The paper might begin with a discussion on the economics of
regulation and paint a broad picture of the ongoing deregulation efforts in the Philippines. Then
the paper might proceed by focusing on one industry, say housing, and examine the regulatory
environment. The works of researchers in Latin America will greatly help in the formulation
of research agenda in this area. It is worthwhile to note that this is one area where special
attention be given to the transmission mechanisms. The focus on housing industry will
strengthen the linkage of this paper with the macroeconomic analysis paper and the industry and
informal sector paper.
8. IMPACTS ON WOMEN - Ms. Jeanne Frances IUo, IPC
The issues to be covered here cut across the issues that will be covered in other papers,
but with special emphasis on gender issues. For instance, the studies on the informal sector
suggest a much larger role for women in the adjustment process at the community and household
levels. Coping mechanisms, discussed in the general framework paper by Lamberte et al. will
be worthwhile examining at the community and household levels, particularly from the gender
perspective.
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